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INCOME TAX PRACTICE AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS:
THE CASE FOR A STATUS BASED EXEMPTION FROM STATE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW RULES
by
MATTHEW A. MELONE*
The law is not a profession so easily acquired.
- Sir Walter Scott, Journal, April 30, 1828
Most lawyers are conservative. That's what's wrong with them. They
seem to have a vested interest in not changing the law.
- Lord Denning, Sunday Times, Aug. 1, 1982
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to examine the application of unauthorized
practice of law restrictions to certified public accountants engaged in income
tax practice. Prior to my admission to the bar, I had been a practicing certi-
fied public accountant and, like many of my colleagues, did not believe that
the scope of my profession's services in tax matters was subject to serious
dispute. However, exposure to attorneys, particularly those not in tax prac-
tice, has led me to conclude that the bar has not come to any universally agreed
upon conclusions about the role that certified public accountants may prop-
erly play in tax matters. Recent events have supported my conclusion.'
Accountants and lawyers have struggled for some time in their attempts
to reach a consensus concerning their respective roles in income tax
practice.2 In t944 the National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public
* Assistant Professor of Law, Leigh University.
1. The American Bar Association has been studying the practice of accounting firms using
in-house lawyers to practice before the Tax Court. See Deborah Lohse, Tax Report, WALL ST.
J., May 18, 1994, at Al. Non-lawyers are authorized, pursuant to Tax Court Rules, to practice
before the Tax Court. See infra note 31. Moreover, in 1992 a comprehensive set of
'unauthorized practice of law' rules was submitted to the Supreme Court of South Carolina
for adoption. These proposed rules, if adopted, would have restricted the ability of certified
public accountants to practice in certain tax related areas. See infra notes 146-48 and
accompanying text.
2. Disputes among the two professions began to surface in the early 1930s. As an opening
salvo, several bar associations were proposing or supporting legislation at the state and federal
levels, that would have restricted the rights of accountants to practice before administrative
agencies. See 2 JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: To
RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY 204-05 (AICPA 1970).
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Accountants was formed. This group, comprised of members of both profes-
sions, sought to resolve issues of mutual interest in a cooperative manner.'
Much of the case law with respect to this issue is old. After 1966, with the
apparent settlement of the federal preemption issue, the volume of case law
dropped significantly.4 However, this seeming tranquility has masked con-
tinuing doubt about the proper parameters of certified public accountants'
practices.
Several factors may cause this controversy to achieve greater promi-
nence in the near future. Technological advances are drastically reducing the
clerical and mechanical aspects of tax return preparation thereby freeing up
time for the accountant to pursue other types of work. Competitive pressures
within the accounting profession also point to aggressive courting of clients
for additional services - as evidenced by Arthur Andersen's decision to
litigate cases before the Tax Court.5 Finally, the ever increasing complexity
of the tax law exerts a pressure toward specialization resulting, consequently,
in the concomitant offering of more specialized services.
This article posits that unauthorized practice of law restrictions should
have no application to income tax practice by certified public accountants.
6
I have not resorted to federal preemption, due process, or other constitutional
grounds to support this position. Instead, I believe that certified public ac-
countants should be granted special status, by virtue of their professional
designation, to practice in the income tax field. This conclusion is based on
an examination of the rationales for unauthorized practice restrictions. In the
case of certified public accountants such restrictions are not necessary. The
displayed competency of certified public accountants in income tax matters,
the strict code of conduct to which they must adhere, and the existence of
3. For the historical background to the formation of the National Conference as well as the
role it played in attempts to forge a consensus among the two professions see id. at 206-57.
The bar has also participated in national groups with professional groups other than certified
public accountants. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1981).
4. Professor Rhode summarized inquiries, investigations, and complaints directed against
laypersons in 1979 by type of practice. In terms of frequency disputes concerning Rhode, tax
practice was not on the list. See id. at 28-29.
5. See supra note 1, at Al.
6. Almost all jurisdictions have grandfather rules for various classes of accountants who
are not certified, for example, public accountants, licensed public accountants, or registered
public accountants. Moreover, 14 states have a continuing class of licensed accountants in
addition to certified public accountants. See DIGEST OF STATE ACCOUNTANCY LAWS AND
STATE BOARD REGULATIONS 97-98 (AICPA, NASBA 1992) [hereinafter DIGEST OF STATE
ACCOUNTANCY LAWS ]. Because my analysis depends, in part, on the ethical duties and
qualifications of certified public accountants my conclusions are limited to that class of
accountants.
[Vol. I11
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adequate remedial schemes to enforce proper professional conduct support
this conclusion.
I have focused my analysis on income tax practice. I believe that the
nature of the income tax laws and the skills required to practice in this area
present the clearest case for removal of all state unauthorized practice restric-
tions. However, the analysis presented should be applicable to other tax
practice areas - for example, estate and inheritance tax or pension planning.
Any difference in the allocation of work among the legal and accounting
professions between these areas and income tax practice should be driven
more from pragmatic concerns than doctrinal differences.7
This article does not address Tax Court practice or practice before any
other judicial forum. A reasoned analysis of this area of practice requires a
detailed analysis of the rules of attorney-client and work product privileges'
as well as the issue of whether certified public accountants can effectively
circumnavigate the applicable rules of procedure.9 Moreover, the effect of
certified public accountants' inability to practice before the Federal courts
must be examined."' Such analysis is beyond the scope of this work.
Part II of this article provides a brief discussion of unauthorized prac-
tice restrictions in general. Particular emphasis is given to the asserted
reasons for such restrictions. In Part III, a detailed analysis of the federal
preemption issue is presented and the scope of services that such preemption
protects from state law restrictions is examined. Part IV presents a detailed
7. See infra note 137.
8. At common law no accountant-client privilege existed. However, 24 states have enacted
accountant-client privilege statutes. Of these states, however, nine provide an exception for
a valid summons or subpoena. See Denzil Causey & Frances McNair, An Analysis of State
Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes and Public Policy Implications for the Accountant-Client
Relationship, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 535, 538 (1990). The privilege does not extend to federal tax
matters. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). Moreover, federal law does not
recognize an accountant's work product privilege. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
465 U.S. 805 (1984), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984). For a discussion of the attorney-
client privilege in the context of federal tax return services see infra note 176.
9. It is possible that conflict of interests will exist, to a greater degree, for certified public
accountants because they are more likely to have been engaged to prepare the tax returns at
issue or to have performed other services that could create a conflict. Moreover, because
certified public accountants are not eligible to practice before the federal courts, the decision
on where to litigate may itself be subject to a conflict. See infra note 10 and accompanying
text.
10. A taxpayer has the ability to forum shop in federal tax matters. The Tax Court has
jurisdiction over deficiency judgments. See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (CCH 1994). Alternatively,
the taxpayer may pay the tax in dispute and sue for refund in federal district court or in the
United States Claims Court. Unless otherwise noted all references to the I.R.C. are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and available in the Internal Revenue Code
volumes of the Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH).
1995]
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analysis and critique of the leading cases dealing with the issue of tax
practice as the unauthorized practice of law.
Part V presents the arguments for an unfettered role in income tax
practice for certified public accountants. I support this argument, on compe-
tency grounds, by focusing on the unique character of the income tax laws
and, by way of example, using tax return practice as evidence of competence
in a broader practice sense. Finally, the regulatory scheme to which certified
public accountants are subject is examined.
II. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW: IN GENERAL
Restrictions on the practice of law by the laity have been in existence for
quite some time." In several instances, the strictures predate the birth of the
accounting profession.' 2 Various mechanisms are in place to enforce these
restrictions. Courts have traditionally asserted their inherent power over those
persons that practice before them, and have punished the unauthorized prac-
tice of law as contempt of court. 3 A substantial majority of states prescribe
misdemeanor penalties for the unauthorized practice of law. 4 Enforcement of
existing prohibitions is undertaken by state bar organizations, unauthorized
practice committees of a state, county, or local bar organization, and state
attorneys general or local district attorneys."
11. A relatively comprehensive historical account of the statutes and case law governing
the regulation of law practice is Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law:
Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors - or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 159, 161-90.
12. According to Barlow Christensen, the origin of legislation in five states can be traced
to the mid-1800s and in several other states legislation predates 1920. See id. at 180. The
status of accounting as a profession is a relatively recent development. The first legislation
creating the professional designation "Certified Public Accountant" was enacted on April 17,
1896 in New York. The period between 1913, the year the Sixteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution was enacted, and 1934, after passage of the federal securities
legislation, marked the growth and establishment of accountancy as a profession. See generally
JAMES DON EDWARDS, HISTORY OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1960).
See also infra note 172 and accompanying text.
13. See Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial
Powers, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 162 (1960). Most states, by statute, vest the judiciary with the
power to regulate the practice of law. See Note, Remedies Available to Combat the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 501, 501 n.4 (1962).
14. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 11-12 n.39 (compiling citations to statutes of 37
jurisdictions).
15. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 11-21. Based on her empirical study Professor Rhode
asserts that, in the vast majority of states, bar committees are the only active enforcer of the
restrictions on law practice. Rhode, supra note 3, at 19. Professor Rhode points out that
seven states, principally due to antitrust concerns, do not have unauthorized practice
committees nor any agency active in enforcement of unauthorized practice prohibitions. Rhode,
[Vol. I11
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Restrictions placed upon the laity are justified by two broad arguments. 6
The first argument advanced is that regulation of law practice serves to main-
tain judicial integrity. Proponents of this theory assert that regulation is
needed to preserve courtroom decorum and as an aid in disciplining miscre-
ant attorneys. 7
Secondly, and more importantly, unauthorized practice restrictions are
necessary in order to prevent an unfettered market for legal services from
harming consumers. Several rationales support this conclusion. First,
consumer protection is required to protect the public from incompetent prac-
titioners - the competency rationale. 8 A second rationale supporting this
theory - the motivational rationale - is rooted in the notion that attorneys,
supra note 3, at 14. Lay person involvement in the enforcement process is minimal. Rhode,
supra note 3, at 15. For further discussion of the role of bar organizations in policing the laity
see Christensen, supra note 11, at 189-190; Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business
of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HAST. L.J. 577, 582-84
(1989). Indirect enforcement of prohibitions on the practice of law by the laity occurs through
challenges to contractual obligations on illegality or public policy grounds. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 181 (1979). See also infra note 55.
16. A third, and often unspoken, rationale for regulation of legal service providers is
economic protectionism. Although this theory may be equated with pure and simple economic
rent seeking it is often meant to express the notion that unfettered competition from lay
persons would be disastrous to the legal profession. This is because the legal profession is
hampered by restrictions that do not apply to the laity. Consequently, in addition to placing
members of the bar at a competitive disadvantage, the vices that professional standards were
meant to avoid would, in all probability, be imputed upon the profession in any event. See
Andrews, supra note 15, at 616 (quoting REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES OF
BAR ASSOCIATIONS (1920)). For a detailed analysis of professional regulation of lawyers
and legal services from a market dominance perspective see RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN
LAWYERS (1989). This rationale, rarely made explicit, is occasionally denied. See Chicago
Bar Ass'n. v. United Taxpayers of America, 38 N.E.2d 349, 351 (I11. App. Ct. 1941) (citing
People v. Alfani, 125 N.E. 671 (N.Y. 1919) for the statement that practice restrictions
are "not for the purpose of creating a monopoly in the legal profession nor for its protec-
tion... ").
17. See Comment, On Letting the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized
Practice Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1515, 1535 (1984) (citing Frederick C. Hicks & Elliott R.
Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies, 41 YALE L.J. 69, 70-72 (1931)).
18. This is the predominate theme that runs through the case law dealing with accountants
rendering tax services. See, e.g., Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Minn. 1951)
(stating that the purpose of practice restrictions is " to protect the public from the intolerable
evils which are brought upon people by those who assume to practice law without having the
proper qualification"); In re New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 218-19
(N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (holding that accountants do not have "the orientation" to qualify as
tax attorneys). The increase in malpractice claims against attorneys in recent years may call
this rationale into question. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 154. However, because I am
concerned with the role of certified public accountants in tax practice, a challenge to the
competency rationale would require a comparison of malpractice litigation between these
groups - which I did not obtain. In any event, my goal is to establish the competency of
certified public accountants in tax practice and not to discredit tax attorneys.
19951
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in conducting their professional affairs, operate in a fundamentally different
fashion than lay persons. Invariably, these putative differences operate to the
benefit of the consumers. For example, lawyers, in the minds of some people,
are not motivated, to the same extent as others, by profit.' 9 Moreover, lay
persons would be subject to less restrictions in advertising and soliciting for
clients.2" Trends in the market for legal services that began in the late 1970s
may have completely discredited this theory.2
A third rationale underpinning the consumer protection theory is the
remedial rationale. Lawyers are subject to court supervision and sanction for
failure to comply with professional standards. Moreover, the existence of
professional standards themselves serve to distinguish attorneys from the
laity.22 Of course, the importance of this distinguishing feature correlates
positively with the extent to which ethical prescriptions are heeded and, when
breached, punishment ensues.
23
Although all states prescribe sanctions for the unauthorized practice of
law, the states are far from uniform in their attempt to define, with precision,
19. Dean Roscoe Pound asserted that the spirit of public service is the most important
characteristic of a profession and the legal profession, to maintain fidelity to this characteristic,
must make the pursuit of monetary gains subservient to other, more altruistic goals. See
ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES (1953).
20. To an extent, the existence of such restrictions contradicts the notion that lawyers are
not motivated by profit to the same extent as other groups. If this were so the necessity for
such restrictions would be eliminated.
21. See Andrews, supra note 15, at 601-03. Professor Andrews argues that the argument
that a profit motive is detrimental to consumers lacks empirical support and, moreover, if
true, would serve as an indictment of the entire United States economy. In addition, he
challenges the argument itself by positing that there is no reason to suppose laypersons operate
any differently than lawyers. Finally, Professor Andrews asserts that this argument suffers
from a simplistic, even arrogant view of laypersons by concluding that nonmonetary
motivations reside exclusively with lawyers. Note that if public service is a hallmark of a
profession, as Dean Pound believed, then attempts to use this rationale as support for a lawyer
monopoly over tax practice implies that accountancy is not a profession - at least in the
sense that Dean Pound had in mind. The notion that lawyers are less motivated by profit than
others does not appear to resonate with the public. 59% of those surveyed believed that
lawyers are greedy and only 19% disagreed with that characterization. See Amy Stevens,
Lawyers and Clients, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1994, at B5 (reporting the results of a 1993
survey taken by Peter D. Hart Research Associates for the American Bar Association).
22. The Gardner court placed great weight on this factor. See infra note 81 and
accompanying text. See also Andrews, supra note 15, at 603. Professor Andrews' article
deals with the restrictions placed upon lawyers that wish to associate with non-lawyers. Much
of his analysis, however, applies with equal force to general restrictions on lay persons.
23. Professor Abel's view is not encouraging - neither in terms of lawyer compliance
with standards nor with respect to the imposition of sanctions for their breach. See ABEL,
supra note 16, at 147-50. See also J. SUTTON & J. DZIENKOWSI, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS 127 (1989); Richard L. Abel, The Decline of Professionalism?,
49 MOD. L. REV. 1,46-47 (1986).
[Vol. I11
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just what activities constitute law practice. Professor Rhode categorized the
existing statutes into three genres. The first type of statute makes no attempt
to define the practice of law.24 The second type of statute provides a circular
definition that, in essence, defines law as "what lawyers do." 25 The third
category of statute provides a list of activities that constitute the practice of
law. 6 However, the lists provided fail, invariably, to delineate with reason-
able clarity the boundaries that the laity may not cross.2"
The practice of law is not confined to the conduct of cases in court. The
rendering of legal advice, representation before administrative agencies, and
preparation of legal instruments have all been held to constitute the practice
of law.28 Moreover, the activities that are commonly put forth - whether by
statute or by the courts - as constituting the practice of law are phrased in
general, oftentimes vague, terms.2 9 As a result, these restrictions have
24. Rhode, supra note 3, at 45 & n.135.
25. Rhode, supra note 3, at 45 & n.136. As Professor Rhode points out, this is the approach
taken by the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. See Model Code Of
Professional Responsibility EC 3-5 (1980) (stating that "the practice of law relates to the
rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer"). The
ABA Model Rules do not attempt to define the practice of law. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 cmt. (1983).
26. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 46 & nn. 140-44.
27. In unusual cases a statute will be very specific as to what activity or activities are
reserved exclusively for members of the bar. See, e.g., infra note 133 and accompanying text
(involving a New Jersey statute that was very specific in delineating what services may not
performed by non-lawyers). Uncertainty as to where the line of demarcation between proper
and unauthorized services is drawn is exacerbated by some courts through separation of powers
disputes. For example, in Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 38 N.E.2d 349
(Ill. App. Ct. 1941), the court held void a rule promulgated by the state Department of Finance,
pursuant to statutory authority, that allowed certified public accountants to represent taxpayers
at hearings before the department. The court stated that "[t]he General Assembly has no
authority to grant a layman the right to practice law . . . . Nor can the General Assembly
lawfully declare not to be the practice of law, those activities the performance of which the
judicial department may determine to be the practice of law." Id. at 351 (quoting People ex
rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Ill. 1937)). The question of comity
among the legislative and judicial branches arises frequently with respect to rules governing
administrative practice. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-19-51 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.02(1) (West
1990). See also Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1939)
(citing In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313, 317 (Mass. 1935)), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
625 (1940); Jemo Associates, Inc. v. Lindley, 415 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ohio 1980); Tumulty v.
Rosenblum, 48 A.2d 850, 852 (N.J. 1946); Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 5 N.W.2d
914, 918 (Iowa 1942); State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 5 S.E.2d 181 (S.C. 1939).
29. See, e.g., Jemo Assoc., Inc. v. Lindley, 415 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ohio 1980)(stating that,
in addition to other enumerated activities, "action taken . . . in matters connected with the
law" constitutes the practice of law) (quoting Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken,
193 N.E. 650 (Ohio 1934)); Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 5 N.W.2d 914, 918
(Iowa 1942) (including as the practice of law, the carrying on of "the business of an attorney").
For an analysis of due process issues raised, inter alia, by the vagueness of the restrictions
19951
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spawned a tremendous amount of litigation.30
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE SPERRY DOCTRINE
Before undertaking a detailed analysis of the case law involving tax
practice two questions need to be answered. First, to what extent has federal
law preempted state law in this area? Second, assuming that federal law has
preempted state law to a significant extent, does the subject matter that sur-
vives preemption warrant significant attention?
A certified public accountant may, pursuant to statutory authority, rep-
resent a person before the Internal Revenue Service.3 Moreover, the Treasury
Department is authorized to impose standards of conduct for individuals who
practice before it.32 Regulations have been issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury pursuant to this authority.3 3 These regulations, commonly referred
to as Circular 230, govern practice before the Internal Revenue Service.
see Rhode, supra note 3, at 45-55. Occasionally, however, a court will provide detailed
guidance. See, e.g., In re The Florida Bar, 355 So. 2d 766, (Fla. App. 1978) (listing, among
21 separately enumerated conclusions of law, various activities performed in pension planning
that the court considered to be the practice of law). Note that The Florida Bar was decided
on a stipulated record and upon facts that occurred prior to the enactment of federal legislation
that now occupies the field of most employee benefits. Consequently, The Florida Bar is of
little relevance in the pension field. See The Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer
Preparation of Pension Plans, 571 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. 1990).
30. An analysis, or even a summary, of the case law in this area is beyond the scope of this
work. For a compilation and overview of the case law dealing with unauthorized practice of
law issues see 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 101 (1980 & Supp. 1994); 7 C.J.S. Attorney
& Client § 29 (1980 & Supp. 1994); R.E. Heinselman, Annotation, What Amounts to Practice
of Law, Ill A.L.R. 19 (1937); Annotation, What Amounts to Practice of Law, 125 A.L.R.
1173 (1940). See also UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK (J. Fischer & D. Lachmann eds.
1972).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 500(c) (1988). Certified public accountants may also be admitted to practice
before the Tax Court. However, unlike Circular 230, certified public accountants are not
eligible for admission by virtue of their professional status. Instead, they, like any other
nonlawyer, must qualify by submitting to a written 'examination and, if the Tax Court so
requires, an oral examination. Failure of the written examination three times precludes the
taking of further examinations. See T.C.R. 200(a)(3). Attorneys are admitted to practice
before the Tax Court upon showing membership in good standing of the Bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States or the highest court of any state, the District of Columbia, or any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. See T.C.R. 200(a)(2). Note that
I.R.C. § 7452 precludes the denial of admission to practice before the Tax Court to any
person because of that person's failure to be a member of any profession or calling.
32. 31 U.S.C. § 330 (1988).
33. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (1994) [hereinafter Circular 230]. A complete revision of Circular
230 was adopted on August 13, 1966. Amendments have been made periodically with the
most recent amendments effective June 15, 1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994). See
[1994] 15 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) T 44,500A for the history and a complete reprint of
Circular 230.
[Vol. I11
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Attorneys and certified public accountants are authorized to practice before
the Internal Revenue Service by virtue of their professional status. 34 How-
ever, section 10.32 of Circular 230 provides that "[n]othing in the regulations
in this part shall be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar
to practice law." If "practice before the Internal Revenue Service" encom-
passes activities that fall within the definition of law practice then the
regulations seemingly contain an internal inconsistency.
Circular 230 defines "practice before the Internal Revenue Service" very
broadly. 35 It is beyond dispute that the definition of "practice before the
Internal Revenue Service" includes activities that have traditionally been
considered the practice of law. 36 Prior to 1963 state courts had held that
the language in Circular 230 disclaiming any grant of authority to laypersons
to practice law applied to limit the scope of permissible activities before the
Internal Revenue Service. 31 In essence, the courts held that state law govern-
ing the unauthorized practice of law was expressly preserved by Circular
230.
34. See Circular 230, § 10.3(a)-(b). Enrolled actuaries are granted similar privileges with
respect to certain practice areas. Id. § 10.3(d). All other persons seeking to practice before
the Internal Revenue Service must enroll as an agent, which requires, in most cases, the
passing of a written examination administered by the Internal Revenue Service. See id. §
10.4. In order to practice before the Internal Revenue Service the attorney or certified public
accountant in question must not currently be under suspension or disbarment from such practice
and must file a written declaration that she is currently qualified as an attorney or certified
public accountant, as the case may be, and is authorized to represent the particular party on
whose behalf he acts. Id. § 10.3(a)-(b). Circular 230 relegates the determination of whether
an individual is duly qualified as an attorney to state law. See Circular 230, § 10.2(b)-(c).
The automatic qualification of attorneys and certified public accountants is pursuant to Pub.
L. No. 89-332, 79 Stat. 1282 (1965). Attorneys are authorized to represent others before any
agency while the authorization granted to certified public accountants is limited to
representation of others before the Internal Revenue Service. Id. § l(a)-(b). Note that, pursuant
to other authority, certified public accountants are authorized to practice before other federal
agencies. See, e.g., 4 C.F.R. § 11.1 (1993) (authorizing persons other than lawyers to practice
before the General Accounting Office); 12 C.F.R. § 623.3(a)(2) (1993) (authorizing accountants
to practice before the Farm Credit Administration).
35. Circular 230, § 10.2(e) provides that:
Practice before the Internal Revenue Service comprehends all matters connected with
a presentation to the Internal Revenue Service or any of its officers or employees
relating to a client's rights, privileges, or liabilities under laws or regulations
administered by the Internal Revenue Service. Such presentations include preparing
and filing necessary documents, corresponding and communicating with the Internal
Revenue Service, and representing a client at conferences, hearings, and meetings.
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., In re Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954); Petition of Kearney,
63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953) (en banc); New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209
(N.Y. 1948); In re Lyon, 16 N.E.2d 74 (Mass. 1938). But see Noble v. Hunt, 99 S.E.2d 345
(Ga. Ct. App. 1957).
19951
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In 1963 the United States Supreme Court decided Sperry v. Florida.3' At
issue in Sperry was whether the state of Florida could prohibit a layperson
from practicing before the United States Patent Office pursuant to regulations
issued by the Commissioner of Patents with the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce. The state of Florida had argued that the authorization granted by
the federal regulations should be construed to co-exist with state unauthorized
practice law, relying on language in the regulations that limited the authority
conferred to practice before the Patent Office.39 The Court did not question
the state's determination that preparation and prosecution of patents applica-
tions constituted the practice of law.4" Instead, the Court held for the peti-
tioner on Supremacy Clause grounds stating that "'the law of the State...
must yield' when incompatible with federal legislation." 41 The Sperry ratio-
nale has been applied to practice before the Internal Revenue Service.42
Although the Sperry preemption doctrine has been applied to federal tax
practice the status of state unauthorized practice law retains importance. On
a broad level, the notion that certified public accountants are authorized to
practice in the tax field simply because the federal government has chosen to
allow them to do so serves to diminish the stature of the accounting profes-
sion. Such a view tends to place the law profession in a position of tolerating
an encroacher on its turf. Moreover, in a more practical sense, state law will
38. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
39. The regulation in question provided that "[r]egistration in the Patent Office ... shall
only entitle the persons registered to practice before the Patent Office." Id. at 386 (quoting
37 C.F.R. § 1.341). A predecessor provision contained broader language similar to that
found in § 10.32 of Circular 230. The Court found that "the progression to more circumscribed
language" tended to indicate that the limitation in question merely precluded general patent
law practice. Id. The Court did not, however, indicate whether, under the language of the
predecessor provision, state law could apply. However, the Court did note that the regulations
governing trademark cases, unlike the patent regulation at issue, expressly preserved the
applicability of state unauthorized practice law. See id.
40. Id. at 383.
41. Id. at 384 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 U.S. (I Wheat.) 211 (1824)).
42. See The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of Pension Plans,
571 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1990); Grace v. Allen, 407 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also
Boris I. Bittker, Does Tax Practice by Accountants Constitute the Unauthorized Practice of
Law?, 25 J. TAX'N. 184 (1966); BERNARD WOLFMAN, ET AL., 2 STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE
805.02 (CCH Tax Trans. Lib. 1992). The application of Sperry in the federal tax context has
generated some doubt. In his article, Professor Bittker asserts that the enactment of Pub. L.
No. 89-332, 79 Stat. 1281 (1965), actually weakens the Sperry preemption argument but
concludes that the Sperry rationale should still apply. Professor Bittker based his conclusion,
in part, on the fact that Pub. L. No. 89-332 did not alter the status of enrolled practioners who
are neither attorneys nor certified public accountants and, consequently, it would be unlikely
that the courts would impose state law restrictions on certified public accountants. See Bittker,
supra note 42, at 185-86. Moreover, the regulatory language in question in Sperry differed
from that found in Circular 230. See supra note 39.
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continue to have applicability in several contexts. First, and quite obviously,
state law will continue to have vitality in the state and local tax context - an
increasingly important practice area for tax professionals. Secondly, Circu-
lar 230 practice authority extends only to practice before the Internal Revenue
Service.13 The reach of the Sperry doctrine to federal tax practice will
depend upon how broadly "practice before the Internal Revenue Service" is
defined.44
Section 10.2(e) of Circular 230 paints with a broad brush and provides
a blurry line of demarcation between "practice before the Internal Revenue
Service" and other services in the federal tax field. In order for a person to be
"practicing before the Internal Revenue Service" the services performed by
such person must be "connected with [presentations] to the Internal Revenue
Service." 4" The construction of the term "connected with" is critical. For
example, tax return preparation is considered "practice before the Internal
Revenue Service."46 Is tax advice concerning a pending transaction "con-
nected with" the preparation of a tax return? A plausible argument may be
made that such advice is connected with the preparation of a tax return be-
cause the transaction or the effect of the transaction will be reported on a
return .
47
43. The Sperry doctrine presumably would also apply to the Tax Court Rules. These Rules
provide for non-lawyer practice before the Tax Court in certain circumstances. See supra
note 31.
44. The potential for recurring disputes, despite Sperry, is highlighted by the Rules
Governing the Unauthorized Practice of Law in the State of South Carolina proposed by the
South Carolina Bar Association in 1992. Comments to Proposed Rule 6 appear to have
incorporated both the Bercu and Gardner tests by stating that "a non-lawyer ... may not hold
himself out as qualified to deal with difficult and involved questions of tax law, wholly apart
from any engagement to prepare tax returns or practice before the Internal Revenue Service."
The Supreme Court of South Carolina did not adopt the proposed rules. See infra notes
146-48 and accompanying text.
45. Circular 230, § 10.2(e).
46. Tax return preparers are excluded from the general eligibility requirements of Circular
230. Circular 230, § 10.7. Prior to 1984, tax return preparation was specifically excluded
from the definition of practice before the Internal Revenue Service. As part of the 1984
amendments to Circular 230 this exclusion was deleted and the above exception for tax return
preparers was added. See BERNARD WOLFMAN, ET AL., I STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE
117.011 (CCH Tax Trans. Lib. 1992).
47. One can muddy the waters quite easily by inquiring as to the purpose of the advice.
Should it matter that the advice was rendered specifically to determine how to report a pending
transaction on a return; whether such advice was given to achieve a particular tax result
regardless of how it is to be reported; or whether the advice was given for a non-tax purpose
altogether, such as its effect on earnings per share? Note that the regulations defining tax
return preparer provide that a tax return preparer includes a person that renders advice
pertaining to events that have occurred and directly relevant to the making of an entry on a
return or claim for refund. See infra note 48.
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A better approach is to take a more circumscribed view of "practice
before the Internal Revenue Service." First, although Circular 230 does not
delineate the scope of services constituting tax return preparation, the regu-
lations defining a tax return preparer do, and expressly exclude a person that
gives advice on a prospective transaction from the definition of a tax return
preparer.4 8 Moreover, because section 10.7 of Circular 230 exempts tax re-
turn preparers from the general eligibility requirements of practice before the
Internal Revenue Service, 9 a broad construction of what services are con-
nected with tax return preparation would invite unlicensed and unregulated
individuals to seek solace in federal preemption from state attempts to
regulate them. Secondly, Circular 230 by its terms, envisions direct contact,
either through a filing or some form of communication with the Internal
Revenue Service.5" Therefore, assuming that a prospective transaction is not
48. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(2) (1980) provides that:
A person who only gives advice on specific issues of law shall not be considered an
income tax return preparer, unless -
(i) The advice is given with respect to events which have occurred at the time the
advice is rendered and is not given with respect to the consequences of contemplated
actions; and
(ii) The advice is directly relevant to the determination of the existence,
characterization, or amount of an entry on a return or claim for refund. For example, if
a lawyer gives an opinion on a transaction which a corporation has consummated,
solely to satisfy an accountant (not at the time a preparer of the corporation's return)
who is attempting to determine whether the reserve for taxes set forth in the corporation's
financial statement is reasonable, the lawyer shall not be considered a tax return preparer
solely by reason of rendering such opinion.
49. See supra note 46. Unenrolled tax return preparers may not, however, represent a
client during an examination unless they have personally signed the return as preparer. See
I.R.S. Announcement 65-2, I.R.B. 1965-2, 14.
50. In defining who may practice before the Internal Revenue Service, Circular 230 states
that an attorney or certified public accountant must file a written declaration that he is qualified
as an attorney or certified public accountant and is authorized to represent the particular
party on whose behalf he acts. See Circular 230, §§ 10.3(a)-(b), 10.5.
Circular 230 also provides requirements that a practitioner must comply with in rendering
tax shelter opinions. See id. § 10.33. It is arguable that, by promulgating standards with
respect to third party opinions, Circular 230 has broadened the potential scope of the Sperry
doctrine. This was the position taken by petitioners in their brief challenging the proposed
unauthorized practice rules by the South Carolina Bar, discussed infra at notes 147-48 and
accompanying text. However, § 10.33 does not provide a positive grant of authority to
practitioners to render such opinions. Instead, it provides guidance to those that render such
opinions. Because a practitioner, for purposes of § 10.33, is defined to include anyone eligible
to practice before the Internal Revenue Service it is questionable, both as a matter of
interpretation and policy, whether an otherwise unlicensed and unregulated individual should
be allowed to perform all the activities that are required in rendering tax shelter opinions.
See Circular 230, § 10.33(a)(l)-(6) & (c)(l). Moreover, in light of § 10.33, it is possible that
certified public accountants may be precluded, under state law, from rendering such opinions.
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the subject of a ruling request, then advice on structuring such transactions
should not be considered to be "practice before the Internal Revenue Service."
IV. CASE LAW: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
This section presents an analysis of the leading cases that have been
decided involving tax practice as the unauthorized practice of law. Many of
these cases involve accountants who were not certified and, in some cases,
practitioners who were not accountants at all. 5' The courts seemingly placed
no emphasis on the status of the person performing the disputed services -
except the fact that they were not members of the bar - and consequently,
these cases provide useful insight into the courts' view of tax practice. The
cases that follow involve the rendering of traditional tax services, such as tax
return preparation and tax advice. Laypersons, including accountants, have,
of course, been the subject of proceedings that involve services or practices
that clearly breach any line of demarcation between appropriate professional
practice and unauthorized practice of law. In some of these cases tax matters
form part of the factual backdrop.52 Because my analysis is limited to tax
practice an analysis of the law pertinent to such practices is beyond the scope
of this work.
The courts have tended to test the practices of laypersons in income tax
matters using two tests - one based on the form of service delivery and the
other based on the difficulty of the services delivered. The discussion that
51. In some cases the court failed to mention whether the accountant was certified or not.
52. See, e.g., Lowe v. Presley, 71 S.E.2d 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that a layperson
rendering advice to individuals under indictment for willful evasion of federal income tax
constituted the unauthorized practice of law). In Lowe, the defendant advised his clients of
the nature of charges against them and as to the making of a plea of guilty or not guilty. Id. at
733. Ironically, in this case the defendant was also found to be unqualified to perform
accounting and auditing services necessary to provide information for the client's defense.
See also The Florida Bar v. Town, 174 So. 2d 395, 397 (Fla. 1965) (enjoining the accountant-
respondent from "preparation of corporate charters, bylaws, resolutions, and other documents
incidental to the contractual rights of the corporation, its incorporators, and stockholders");
In re The Florida Bar, 317 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975) (enjoining the respondent from advertising
as an attorney at law, specializing in tax matters, when she was, in fact, not a licensed attorney);
DeLeon v. Saldana, 745 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (assuming that, in an action for
quantum meruit, the jury considered only tax related work and not services rendered in
preparing articles of dissolution, corporate minutes, and other documents that plaintiff
accountant conceded as unauthorized legal work). The inconsistency of the courts' view of
tax practice is highlighted in the dicta of DeLeon and Town. In DeLeon the court did not
disturb the trial court's holding that the plaintiff could proceed with his quantum nreruit
claim for tax advice in connection with corporate dissolution. See DeLeon, 745 S.W.2d at 57.
However, in Town, one of the considerations that the court factored into its conclusion that
the respondent was practicing law was "the interest of federal taxing authorities in corporate
financing." See Town, 174 So. 2d at 397.
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follows analyzes the cases that have applied these tests and presents several
recent cases that have evidenced a progression toward discarding these tests.
A. Incidental Services Test
The incidental services test has been applied in a variety of practice
areas. 3 This test is a pragmatic response to the reality that many fields of
endeavor involve, to varying degrees, the application of legal principles to
particular factual circumstances. The leading case that applied the inciden-
tal services test to tax practice is In re New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 4
referred to as the Bercu case. The petitioner brought a contempt proceeding55
53. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 30, § 101.
54. 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948).
55. The issue of whether tax practice constitutes the practice of law generally arises in the
context of contempt, injunction, and disciplinary proceedings or actions to enforce a contract.
Occasionally, the issue arises in other contexts. For example, in Goldenberg v. Comm'r, 65
T.C.M. (CCH) 2338 (1993), a similar issue arose, ironically, in the context of substantive tax
law. At issue was whether a licensed attorney and certified public accountant could deduct
the cost of a graduate law degree in taxation as a trade or business expense pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 162. Section 162 requires, inter alia, that, in order to be deductible, expenses must be paid
or incurred in carrying on any trade or business. See I.R.C. § 162(a). The petitioner was not
engaged in the practice of law at the time he was pursuing his graduate law degree but did
practice law as a law firm associate after receiving his degree. See Goldenberg, 65 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 2339. The petitioner asserted that he was engaged in the practice of law prior to
entering graduate school as a result of his prior employment with the Internal Revenue Service.
The court acknowledged that a person may be carrying on trade or business while unemployed
if that person previously carried on such business and intended to return to it. However, the
court held that prior employment as an Internal Revenue Service revenue agent, appeals
officer, or as a certified public accountant did not constitute the practice of law. Id. at 2340.
See also Bancroft v. Indem. Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. La. 1962) (holding that
accountant's malpractice insurance policy covered liability for negligently rendered tax
opinions in the face of the insurer's assertion that the insured was engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law).
An interesting issue was raised in Goldenberg. The petitioner argued, alternatively, that
the educational expenses should be allowed as a deduction because he was carrying on the
business of tax accounting. The court, assuming arguendo, that the a layperson could deduct
graduate legal studies, held that the taxpayer failed to prove his intention to return to the
practice of tax accounting. See Goldenberg, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2340-41. If the reasoning
of Bercu or Gardner were followed it is somewhat difficult to comprehend the utility of a
graduate law degree in taxation to an accountant. In order to deduct educational expenses a
taxpayer must, inter alia, incur those expenses in order to maintain or improve skills required
by his employer or by law or regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1)( 1967). Alternatively,
such expenses could be incurred to meet the express requirements of an employer or applicable
law or regulation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2) (1967). Consequently, if tax services
were limited either to those performed incidentally in connection with the performance of
other services or those of a simple nature it is questionable whether an advanced education in
taxation could qualify under these standards - especially taking into account the courts'
view of tax return preparation.
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and sought to enjoin the respondent from pursuing certain activities that,
petitioner alleged, constituted the practice of law. The respondent was an
accountant.16 The proceeding arose out of an action brought by the respon-
dent against his client to recover fees for services rendered.57
The City of New York had claims against the Croft Company for retail
sales taxes and compensating use taxes attributable to business done in the
years 1935 through 1937.5s The Croft Company, an accrual basis taxpayer,
earned no profits during those years and disputed the City's claims. In 1943
the company earned large profits and was subject to federal income tax at a
very high marginal tax rate.5 9 The company was contemplating settling the
dispute with the City and sought advice as to whether the amounts owed to the
City would be deductible in the years to which the taxes related, or at the time
the dispute was settled - 1943. The issue, therefore, was when an expense
was properly deductible by an accrual basis taxpayer.
The company's regular accountant, who was also an attorney, advised
the company that the deduction would have to be taken in the years to which
the payments related - 1935 through 1937. At that point the president of the
company sought the respondent's advice. The respondent performed no other
services for the company at that time. The respondent, based upon his review
of case law and a treasury decision, advised the company that the deduction
could be taken in 1943. The court recognized that the application of legal
knowledge is necessary in order for an accountant to properly discharge his
duties but that the application of such knowledge is "only incidental to the
accounting functions."6 In this case the respondent's advice was uncon-
nected with accounting work.6 1
56. The court did not, in its opinion, mention whether the respondent was a certified public
accountant.
57. In re New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
58. Id. at 213. The court did not specify the nature of the Croft Company's dispute with
the City with respect to the sales and use taxes in question. The court did, however, admonish
the respondent for citing I.T. 3441, 1941-1 C.B. 208, a pronouncement that dealt with the
issue of sales taxes only. The court believed that the respondent oversimplified and
inadequately covered the issue he was faced with by failing to assimilate the use tax in his
research. See New York County Lawyers'Ass'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
59. The court stated that the company faced a minimum tax rate of 80% in 1943. Id. at
213. 1 did not examine the relevant statute in effect in 1943. However, because the year in
question was a war year this confiscatory marginal rate appears accurate.
60. Id. at 216.
61. The court stated that an "accountant serves in setting up or auditing books, or advising
with respect to the keeping of books and records, the making of entries therein and the handling
of transactions for tax purposes and the preparation of tax returns." Id. The court did not
define what it meant by the "handling of transactions for tax purposes."
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The court rejected the notion that the tax law is mainly a matter of
accounting."2 The court viewed the tax law as drawn from, and intimately con-
nected with, various branches of law and held that an accountant, "regardless
of specific tax knowledge, does not have the orientation even in tax law to
qualify as a tax lawyer. ' 63 Moreover, the court refused to adopt a case by case
inquiry into the subjective qualifications of the accountant before it, holding
that "[a]n objective line must be drawn, and the point at which it must be
drawn ... is where the accountant or non-lawyer undertakes to pass upon a
legal question apart from the regular pursuit of his calling. 64
The court was concerned that a case by case determination of whether
other branches of law were involved would prove impractical. 65 The court's
reasoning is somewhat contradictory, for if the tax law cannot be distin-
guished from other branches of law, then the need to determine whether other
branches are involved is unnecessary. Ironically, the issue in this case
involved a tax accounting concept - the timing of an expense deduction.
The respondent challenged the logical consistency of denying an ac-
countant the right to advise a taxpayer on a tax question while recognizing his
right prepare tax returns. The respondent asserted that the court's approach
would permit an accountant to advise on a tax issue if it arose during the
preparation of the return but not if the identical issue was the subject of a
separate engagement. The court's reasoning in response to the respondent's
argument is unclear and less than satisfactory. The court merely reiterated its
holding and stated that such a distinction is "altogether valid and desirable. ' 66
The court seemingly rooted the distinction on two grounds. First, the
court appeared to view the tax preparation process as clerical, capable of being
prepared from instructions prepared for lay consumption.67 Secondly, the
court, despite its perceived threat to the public, appeared to be striking a
balance between the law and accounting professions. 68 It appears that the
latter rational was predominant in influencing the court's conclusion because
62. In fact, the court refused to accept the notion that taxation may be properly classified
as a hybrid of law and accounting. See id. at 220.
63. Id. at 218-19. See infra note 170 and accompanying text for a discussion of
specialization by members of the bar.
64. New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
65. See id. at 220.
66. Id. at 221.
67. Id. at 220.
68. The court stated "[i]t is a practical, reasonable and proper accommodation to business
men and the accounting profession not only to permit accountants to prepare tax returns but
to permit them, despite the risks involved, to assume jurisdiction of the incidental legal
questions that may arise in connection with preparing tax returns." Id. (emphasis added).
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the court did not place any caveats on the difficulty of legal questions that may
arise so long as they arise incidentally to the performance of accounting ser-
vices.
The court, in Bercu, did not mention a relatively recent case that did not
adopt the incidental services test. In that case the respondent, a subsidiary of
Standard and Poor's Corporation, provided payroll and social security statis-
tical information to subscribers. 69 The respondent expanded its services to
include a variety of tax related services. Among the services offered were
specific advice and opinions on compliance with existing tax laws and meth-
ods to achieve savings thereon based on subscriber specific information. 0 In
order to provide this service, the corporation interpreted and analyzed court
decisions and government rulings. Moreover, the respondent undertook ac-
tivities that were, by any definition, beyond the scope of accounting or tax
services." In granting the petitioner's application for a perpetual restraining
order against the respondent, the court flatly rejected the adoption of an
incidental services test. The court stated that the fact that "some part of the
service rendered might be said to be fairly incidental to or within a lawful
activity for non-lawyers and on that ground not improper ... obviously can-
not here be a sufficient justification or excuse."71 2 The court did not provide
a detailed rationale for this rejection other than its view that the respondent
had clearly crossed the difficult to define boundary line between permissible
and impermissible practice by accountants. 3
69. In re New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 43 N.Y.S.2d 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943). In a
later case, High v. Trade Union Courier Publishing Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1946),
involving an action for equitable relief, damages, and quantum meruit, the court did not rely
on Bercu. The plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant whereby the plaintiff, in
exchange for a percentage of the amounts saved, would disclose to the defendant confidential
information that would enable the defendant to secure an exemption from federal telephone
excise taxes. Id. at 528. The confidential information, it turned out, was a provision of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Id. at 530. The defendant motioned the court to dismiss on
the pleadings asserting, inter alia, that the transaction was unenforceable because it involved
services that amounted to the unauthorized practice of law. The court denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss stating, without further elaboration, that the advice imparted could not be
said to constitute the practice of law. Id. at 529. Although not clear from the court's recitation
of the facts it appears that the plaintiff did no more than provide a citation to the statute.
70. In re New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
71. The respondent, inter alia, prepared legal clauses for contracts, prepared forms for
corporate resolutions, and reviewed internal documentation for purposes of determining their
legality. See id.
72. Id. It is conceivable that this case may be read for the proposition that the incidental
services test has no application in situations where the alleged unauthorized acts include
activities that involve services that are not directly tax related such as drafting legal documents.
However, the court did not condition its rejection of the incidental test on this ground and
there appears to be no rational basis for refusing to test the individual practices separately.
73. Id. Ironically, one factor that the court considered important was that the information
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In the context of income tax practice the incidental test is unworkable for
several reasons. First, if protection of the public is, as the courts have ex-
pressed, the paramount concern underlying unauthorized practice restrictions
then it difficult to conceive of a good argument supporting the notion that the
public is protected by drawing distinctions based on how the disputed services
are delivered. The form, as opposed to the substance, of the services is
elevated to critical status. Moreover, assuming that this formal distinction
represents a balancing of the benefits of allowing the public the full services
of other professionals with the potential harm of allowing the laity to practice
law, the courts have not provided any reasons why this balancing process
should stop at the point they have chosen.74
Secondly, the incidental test fails to comprehend the nature of tax
accounting practice. As discussed subsequently in this article, the legal issues
encountered in tax return preparation are not incidental to the preparation of
the returns, but are the essence of this service.75 It is conceivable that the
incidental test could have continued vitality in the face of a proper understand-
ing of the tax return process. However, this would require that the entire tax
return preparation service be considered incidental to other services. For
example, the tax return may be considered incidental to performance of an
audit engagement. However, this would require the courts to ignore the fact
that, once the tax return itself is considered a separate activity, it is easily
severable from other activities thereby undermining the rationale for apply-
ing this test. Moreover, this view has the perverse effect of penalizing accoun-
tants specializing in taxation - those that ostensibly should pose less risk to
the public.
B. Difficult v. Elemental Test
The incidental test was rejected in Gardner v. Conway.76 In that case, the
committee for the unauthorized and illegal practice of law of a county bar
upon which the services were based were "gleaned, not from the study of law and legal
books, but wholly from oversimplified compendiums and bulletins essentially issued for
laymen." Id. at 480-81. Much of the criticism leveled at accountants' tax practice is based
on the fact that they are required to read and interpret statutes and case law. The court's
statement appears inconsistent with the Gardner test and the notion that tax return preparation
is properly within the accountant's domain because, among other reasons, it may be
accomplished by reading instructions designed for laypersons. See infra note 120 and
accompanying text.
74. If the incidental test represents, in reality, a politically palatable compromise among
professions then the asserted goal of the public's protection would appear to have been
compromised.
75. See infra notes 181-241 and accompanying text.
76. 48 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1951).
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association sought to have the defendant perpetually enjoined from holding
himself out as an income tax expert, duly qualified to give advice and aid to
the public in the making of income tax returns, and to hold him in contempt
of court for so doing. The defendant had a grade-school education and prac-
ticed as a public accountant after serving for three years as United States
deputy collector of internal revenue.7" The plaintiffs hired a private investi-
gator to pose as a client. During the course of the meeting with the private
investigator the defendant prepared an income tax return and gave advice with
respect to several issues that arose in connection with the preparation of the
return."
The court recognized the difficulty of defining the practice of law, and
stated that:
[t]he development of any practical criterion, as well as its subsequent
application, must be closely related to the purpose for which lawyers are
licensed as the exclusive occupants of their field. That purpose is to pro-
tect the public from the intolerable evils which are brought upon people
by those who assume to practice law without having the proper qualifica-
tions. "
With that goal in mind the court asserted that the privilege of practicing law
is based on "the threefold requirements of Ability, Character, and Responsible
supervision." 8 The court made clear that the third requirement was, if not
paramount, at least distinguishing.8'
In the court's view, the interest of the public would not be served by
77. Id. at 791. For a discussion of the status of public accountants see supra note 6.
78. The defendant advised the client as to whether a partnership existed between he and his
wife; whether he was entitled to an exemption for his wife; whether it was desirable to file a
separate return; whether certain expenditures were capitalizable or deductible; and whether
certain losses caused by flood and frost were deductible. Gardner, 48 N.W.2d at 791-92.
79. Id. at 794.
80. Id. at 795. The court also noted economic self-interest as a motivation for restrictions
to the unauthorized practice of law. Without such restrictions "men of ability and character
will find no inducement to undergo the years of training necessary to qualify them as lawyer."
Id.
81. The court stated:
The public welfare is safeguarded not merely by limiting law practice to individuals
who are possessed of the requisite ability and character, but also by the further
requirement that such practitioners shall thenceforth be officers of the court and subject
to its supervision .... In consequence, lawyers are not merely bound by a high code
of professional ethics, but as officers of the court they are subject to its inherent
supervisory jurisdiction, which embraces the power to remove from the profession
those practitioners who are unfaithful or incompetent in the discharge of their trust.
Id. at 794 (citations omitted).
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drawing distinctions among services rendered based upon whether the ser-
vices' relationship to the objectives of the engagement were primary or inci-
dental. The focus of inquiry should be on the nature of the service and whether
difficult, as opposed to elementary, questions of law are implicated. 2 The
court did, however, hold that the regular practice of law, even if it involves
elementary issues, is the practice of law nonetheless." In essence the court's
test is conjunctive. A lay person may resolve occasional and elementary
questions of law.84
In applying this standard to tax practice, the court, despite recognizing
the significant overlap of law and accounting, refused to categorize tax law
as sui generis. Assuming the validity of taxation's classification as a hybrid
of law and accounting, the court held that "it does not follow that it is so
wholly without the law that its legal activities may be pursued without proper
qualifications and without court supervision."8 The court appeared to ground
its view in the broad training of the lawyer. Specifically, the court attached
significance to knowledge of basic legal concepts, legal processes, and the in-
terrelationships among different branches of the law. Lack of such knowledge
82. Id. at 795-96.
83. The status of tax services performed by a person regularly engaged in the practice of
law was at issue in State v. Willenson, 123 N.W.2d 452 (Wis. 1963). In that case an attorney's
spouse, a non-lawyer, conducted an income tax preparation business within the physical
confines of the attorney spouse's office. The defendant had an interest in the business but
took no supervisory or other responsibility for the work performed. Among the issues presented
in the case was whether a sign advertising the income tax practice was unprofessional conduct.
Id. at 453. The defendant argued that, since his spouse was conducting a business that was
properly performed by a layperson, he is free to advertise that business without regard to
professional restrictions on lawyer advertising. The court held that "[o]ne who seeks assistance
from a lawyer in what appears to him the simplest sort of income-tax problem has a right to
have the lawyer live up to all professional standards in furnishing such assistance." Id. at
454. Moreover, the court felt the spirit of the ethical rules in question would be violated
because a collateral business, "when engaged in by a lawyer, constitutes the practice of law
.... .Id. at 454 n.4 (emphasis added). The court did not, however, attempt to define the
practice of law within the context of tax practice. It merely cited secondary sources for the
proposition that returns of a simple nature are properly prepared by non-lawyers. See id. at
454 n.3 (citing 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 79 and R.F. Martin, Annotation, Services in
Connection With Tax Matters As Practice of Law, 9 A.L.R.2d 797, 801). See also In re
Larson, 485 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1992) (holding, in a disciplinary proceeding, that a tax
preparation practice by a suspended attorney constituted the practice of law). The court in
Larson, did not attempt to categorize tax return preparation work but implied that this type of
work is properly performed by laypersons because the court held that its reasoning "should
not prevent [a suspended attorney] from engaging in tax accounting elsewhere, someplace
that the person is not known as a lawyer." Id. at 350.
84. In a sense the court adopted a form of the incidental test. However, the test would
appear to applied by examining the entire practice of the person in question as opposed to
each individual service performed.
85. Gardner, 48 N.W.2d at 796.
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was deemed, by the court, as narrow specialization of a dangerous kind.86
What standard is to be used in determining whether a legal question is
difficult or elemental? The court held that such a determination is to be made
through the understanding "possessed by a reasonably intelligent layman who
is reasonably familiar with similar transactions."87 The test is applied based
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.88 The court did not
distinguish between laypersons, apparently dividing the universe into lawyers
and non-lawyers.89
Although it refrained from providing a bright line test, the court provided
some inkling as to the line of demarcation in tax practice.
Matters in this field, as in other statutory subjects, will at times involve
difficult questions of statutory interpretation of statute or court decision,
and the validity of regulations or statute; they will also involve doubtful
questions of non-tax law on which tax issues may depend .... Such
questions, in general, are the kind for which lawyers are equipped by train-
ing and practice.9"
The court then specified areas where the accountant may play a key role, such
as inventory accounting methods, accrual issues, depreciation, carryovers and
carrybacks, and consolidated return issues.9'
The reasoning of the Gardner court has been followed in California. In
Agran v. Shapiro,92 an action to recover for accounting services rendered, the
respondent performed three distinct services for the appellant. First, the re-
spondent prepared individual federal income tax returns for the appellant for
the years 1947 to 1950 and estimates for 1951.93 Second, the respondent
86. See id. The court cited In re New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1948) and Albright v. United States, 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949) as evidence of
the danger of narrow specialization and the benefit of broad legal training, respectively. One
is left to wonder how much of an effort was made to find case law going the other way.
87. Gardner, 48 N.W.2d at 796.
88. Id. at 796-97.
89. In fact, the court held that "[a] layman, whether he is or is not an accountant, may not
hold himself out to the public as a tax consultant or a tax expert, or describe himself by any
similar phrase which implies that he has a knowledge of tax law." Id. at 798.
90. Id. at 797 (citing Maurice Austin, Relations Between Lawyers and Certified Public
Accountants in Income Tax Practice, 36 IOWA L. REV. 227, 228 (1951)).
91. Id.
92. 273 P.2d 619 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1954). A second issue presented in this case
was the relationship between federal legislation and regulations and state unauthorized practice
of law rules and whether the former displaces the latter. The court held that state law is not
preempted by the federal rules. See id. at 628-30. Of course, this case was decided prior to
Sperry. For a discussion of the Sperry preemption doctrine see supra notes 31-50 and
accompanying text.
93. Agran, 273 P.2d at 621.
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prepared an application for tentative carryback adjustment of a loss incurred
by the appellant in 1948 to the years 1946 and 1947.94 Finally, the loss
carryback was challenged upon audit and the appellant researched the issues
raised by the revenue agent and held several conferences with the agent. The
principle point of contention was whether the loss incurred in 1948, and car-
ried back to 1946 and 1947, and forward to 1949,91 was incurred in a trade or
business, a necessary condition to the allowance of a carryback. 96 The respon-
dent was successful in his negotiations with the Internal Revenue Service.97
The court, finding that the law and accounting are "inextricably inter-
mingled" 98 in the field of taxation, held that, in preparing the tax returns, the
respondent was not engaging in the practice of law. The court, in reaching its
conclusion, looked to the nature of the taxpayer's return and, in effect,
adopted the Gardner difficult versus elemental test. The court noted that it
had generally been conceded that the preparation of federal income tax returns
is within the proper function of a public accountant, "except perhaps in those
instances where substantial questions of law" are involved. 99 In light of the
taxpayers limited sources of income and the routine nature of their business
operations, the court found the returns to be of "simple character such that an
ordinary layman without legal or accounting training might have prepared
them in the first instance." 00
The court did not, in addressing the preparation of the tax returns, pro-
vide any insights into the standard or standards to be used in measuring the
difficulty or substantiality of legal issues. However, the court did elaborate
on this point in dealing with the issue of whether the other two services per-
formed by the respondent resulted in the unauthorized practice of law.
With respect to the filing of the tentative carryback claims and the
related negotiations with the revenue agent, the court found these services to
constitute the practice of law. The court reasoned that, because the fact that
the loss occurred and the manner in which it arose were not disputed, the only
issue that remained in order to determine whether it qualified for carryback
94. Id.
95. A portion of the 1948 was not absorbed in the carryback years of 1946 and 1947 and,
therefore, was carried forward to 1949. Id. at 622.
96. Id. at 623.
97. Id. at 622.
98. Id. at 623.
99. Id.
100. Id. Presumably, the court's reference to accounting training was merely to embellish
the court's opinion that the returns were simple. It would seem most odd to adopt a test for
determining whether a return is simple enough for an accountant by requiring that accounting
training is unnecessary.
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treatment was whether it was incurred in a trade or business, as required by
statute. In holding that the issue in question was one of law, the court looked
to whether the issue was one that properly resided with a jury to decide. 0
Moreover, the court clearly adopted the Gardner standard after deter-
mining that the issue was a legal one, by inquiring whether the legal question
presented was a difficult or doubtful one. In holding that issue was, in fact,
a difficult one, the court placed reliance on the frequency the issue had been
litigated or ruled upon by the Treasury Department, and the time and effort
expended by the respondent in researching the issue. 102 Additionally, the
court went on to expressly reject the incidental test, quoting extensively from
Gardner."3 The court, however, did not make clear whether it adopted the
Gardner reasonable layman test to determine whether a legal issue is a diffi-
cult one. Instead, the court looked to the effort expended by the tax advisor
in researching the dispute and the relevant historical antecedents.
In Zelkin v. Caruso Discount Corp.,°4 the court had occasion to apply the
reasoning of Agran but, in a decision that highlighted the unworkability of the
Gardner test, found that the case before it was distinguishable from Agran.
The plaintiff, a certified public accountant,'05 represented taxpayers in nego-
tiating with the Internal Revenue Service. This type of service represented the
plaintiff's primary line of business. The defendant engaged the plaintiff to
represent it to contest certain deficiency assessments proposed by the Trea-
sury Department.0 6 The most significant tax issue present was whether the
defendant, a cash basis taxpayer, was in constructive receipt of funds held by
a commercial finance company in reserve. 07 The plaintiff testified that he had
101. The court stated "[wie think that on this proof, no question of fact was presented for
submission to the jury. The undisputed proof made it a question of law for the court." Agran,
273 P.2d at 623-24, (citing Wilson v Eisner, 282 F. 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1922))(a case that dealt
with the issue of whether an activity was engaged in for profit or for pleasure). Moreover,
the court, after citing case law holding that the issue of whether a loss or expense has been
incurred in a trade or business is a factual issue to be resolved on a case by case basis, relied
on an Eighth Circuit case that made the issue subject to de novo court review. Id. at 624
(citing Washburn v. Comm'r, 51 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1931)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 624-26.
104. 9 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
105. The plaintiff also had obtained a law degree but, apparently, was not licensed to
practice law. See id. at 222.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 222-23. The defendant corporation sold conditional sales contracts to Commercial
Credit Corp. As security for the purchase Commercial Credit Corp. was entitled by contract,
to withhold a percentage of the purchase price as a reserve. The original contract, calling for
a five percent retention, was modified to take into account the quality of the paper purchased,
market conditions, and general business activity. Id. at 223. The relevant tax issue concerned
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performed research at two law libraries and reviewed the original reserve
agreement.'0 8 The plaintiff contended, however, that his research was directed
toward a determination of proper accounting methods employed by taxpay-
ers in similar factual settings.0 9
The defendant, citing Agran, asserted that the plaintiff's services con-
stituted the unauthorized practice of law. 0 The court distinguished this case
from Agran. The court placed its emphasis, in part, on the volume of research
undertaken by the layperson when it stated that "[t]he Agran case is, however,
clearly distinguishable from the instant matter, for the accountant there tes-
tified that he cited numerous cases.., and that he 'spent approximately four
days in reading and reviewing over one hundred cases on the proposition of
law involved."" ""I Moreover, it appears the court attempted to divorce tax
accounting from its legal underpinnings. The court held that the plaintiff
"could be said to have been practicing law only if on the face of the problem
which he was negotiating no discussion of that problem would be possible
without reference to legal issues and no persuasive argument could be made
which did not include a discussion of legal principles." '2
In Lowell Bar Ass 'n v. Loeb,"3 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts had before it a petition brought by a local bar association to enjoin the
respondents from giving legal advice in connection with liability to pay in-
come tax and the preparation of income tax returns. The respondents included
an attorney who, while devoting little time to the business in question, owned
American Tax Services, an unincorporated business engaged in preparing
individual income tax returns on a high volume basis - a sort of predecessor
to H.R. Block. Other respondents included the wife of the owner, who
devoted all her time to the business, and a general manager. Only the general
manager was an accountant." 4
The court declined to enunciate any broad principles that were not
necessary in deciding the case. However, the court provided insight into
its view of the prevailing law. First, the court appeared to sanction the
whether Commercial Credit Corp. held reserves in excess of those that it was entitled to hold.
Any such excess would be available to the defendant upon demand and, accordingly, taxable
as if the defendant had received it. A taxpayer is in constructive receipt of funds that are
made available to her to draw upon if notice of intention to withdraw is given. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
108. Zelkin, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 224.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 52 N.E.2d 27 (Mass. 1943).
114. Id. at 30.
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incidental test. The court stated:
The proposition cannot be maintained, that whenever, for compensation,
one person gives to another advice that involves some element of law, or
performs for another some service that requires some knowledge of law,
or drafts for another some document that has legal effect, he is practicing
law. All these things are done in the usual course of the work of occupa-
tions that are universally recognized as distinct from the practice of law.
There is authority for the proposition that the drafting of documents, when
merely incidental to the work of a distinct occupation, is not the practice
of law, although the documents have legal consequences. We cite the
cases for that principle, and not to approve the application of that principle
to the particular facts of the cases cited.'15
The court went on to discuss the drafting of documents incident to other pro-
fessions and occupations, such as architecture, insurance and brokerage.1 6
The court, however, expressly reserved opining on the application of the
incidental test where the issues presented are complex." 7
Secondly, in the context of tax practice, the court appeared to draw a
bright line with respect to certain practices. The commencement of legal
proceedings in court in cases related to taxes is exclusively reserved to law-
yers.'' 8 Moreover, the court stated that:
[d]oubtless the examination of statutes, judicial decisions, and departmen-
tal rulings, for the purpose of advising upon a question of law relative to
taxation, and the rendering to an client of an opinion thereon, are likewise
part of the practice of law in which only members of the bar may en-
gage.19
Finally, the court decided the case at hand based on the simplicity of the
returns prepared by the respondents. "[W]e find the respondents engaged in
the business of making out income tax returns of the least difficult kind....
The forms.., can readily be filled out by any intelligent taxpayer ... who has
the patience to study the instructions." S0 The court rejected the notion that
115. Id. at 31.
116. Id. at 31-32.
117. Id. at 34.
118. Id. at 32-33.
119. Id. at 33. In Groninger v. Fletcher Trust Co., 41 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 1942), the court
held that the furnishing of pamphlets to customers describing the tax law, illustrating tax
liability under different circumstances, and describing the proper method of making returns
could not "be seriously contended ... [as constituting] an unlawful practice of law." Id. at
142. Generally, the sale of printed material, even when purporting to explain legal practices
to the public, has not been held to be the practice of law. The courts are divided, however, on
the question of whether the sale of "how to" kits constitutes the practice of law. See generally
7 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 30, § 102 (1980).
120. Lowell Bar Ass'n, 52 N.E.2d at 34. In Rhode Island Bar Ass'n. v Libutti, 100 A.2d
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there are no real differences between simple and complex legal issues, and
drew on the practices of the community.
Somewhat related to the Gardner line of cases are those that deal with
the issue of accountant representation of taxpayers before state or local admin-
istrative agencies. The outcome of these cases typically turns on whether the
services rendered constitute the practice of law - which, invariably, they
do.' 21 Once that determination is made, the courts have tended to resolve the
issue by examining the rules of the agencies in question and applying a sepa-
ration of powers analysis. 122 The courts have not applied the incidental
test. 23 By implication, these cases stand for the proposition that these services
involve inherently "difficult" matters of law or involve services that are the
exclusive province of attorneys, regardless of their difficulty. Little or no
analysis is performed with respect to the subject matter of the issues that are
before the administrative body in question.
406 (R.I. 1953) the state bar association sought to enjoin a public accountant from preparing
income tax returns. The injunction was sought on two grounds. First, the accountant, not a
certified public accountant nor a member of the American Institute of Accountants, was
precluded by statute from preparing income tax returns. The statute in question limited
return preparers to members of the bar, certified public accountants, or members of the
American Institute of Accountants. Id. at 406-07. Secondly, the accountant, in preparing
returns other than those of taxpayers whose income is less than $5,000, entirely subject to
withholding, and who claim the standard deduction, was engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law. Id. at 407. The court decided the case on the statutory grounds and did not reach the
issue of whether preparation of these more complex returns was the practice of law. Id. at
407-08. Note that one court has held that statutory provisions restricting the class of persons
eligible to prepare income tax returns for compensation to certified public accountants and
attorneys were violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Moore v. Grillis, 39 So. 2d 505,
512 (Miss. 1949) (en banc).
121. But see Tanenbaum v. Higgins, 180 N.Y.S. 738 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1920) (distinguishing
between administrative and judicial bodies and holding that the Tax Department of the City
of New York was not a judicial body and, consequently, practice before it was not the practice
of law).
122. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 38 N.E.2d 349, 351
(Ill. App. Ct. 1941) (holding that the Illinois General Assembly could not authorize, by statute,
lay persons to practice activities that the judiciary determines to be the practice of law). Cf.
Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462 (N.Y. City Ct. 1936) (implying
that an accountant could recover for services rendered had he been practicing before the State
Tax Commission with its permission). The degree of comity between the judicial and other
branches of government varies among the states. See Gregory T. Stevens, The Proper Scope
of Nonlawyer Representation in State Administrative Proceedings: A State Specific Balancing
Approach, 43 VAND. L. REV. 245, 266-72 (1990).
123. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Bailey, 409 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1966) (holding
that the filing of petitions with the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals for review of adverse
rulings entered by the Department of Revenue constituted the practice of law); Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 38 N.E.2d 349 (I11. App. Ct. 1941) (holding that the
preparation and presentation of claims for refund of Illinois Occupational taxes to the Illinois
Department of Finance constituted the practice of law); Mandelbaum, 290 N.Y.S. at 464
[Vol. I11
26
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 11 [1995], Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol11/iss1/2
INCOME TAX PRACTICE AND CPAs
The problem of attempting to resolve unauthorized practice of law
issues by resorting to a difficult, elemental dichotomy should be apparent.
First, the determination of just what is a difficult question itself leads the
courts down a slippery slope. The court in Gardner used a reasonably intel-
ligent layperson as the standard with which to gauge the difficulty of a legal
issue. 12 4 However, the court did not attempt to distinguish among laypersons.
Laypersons familiar with similar transactions obtain their familiarity from
different perspectives. For example, an executive negotiating a transaction
will have a distinct base of knowledge and framework in dealing with such
transactions from the certified public accountant who must report upon it or
the banker who must decide whether to finance the transaction.
The courts in Agran and Zelkin looked to the amount of research under-
taken in determining whether the question at issue was a difficult one.'25 This
reasoning is perverse for two reasons. First, it penalizes diligence. A more
germane question would have been how much research was necessary. Sec-
ondly, because of the factual intensity of many issues, as well as the fact that
tax practitioners are prone to hyperlexis,2 6 a significant body of law has de-
veloped with respect to almost all issues. Using research effort as a proxy for
difficulty ignores the fact that a well developed body of law actually dimin-
ishes the difficulty of solving particular problems. The impracticality of this
test was evidenced by two courts holding, in essence, that an accountant may
properly undertake to perform services for which an accountant was not
needed at all. 127
(stating that the rendering of an opinion used in the application of tax refunds, as to the
meaning of a New York statute, constituted the practice law). In Mandelbaum the court
implied that practice before the administrative agency in question would be proper, assuming
that the agency's rules permitted lay representation. Id. In Chicago Bar Ass'n the defendant
did raise the defense that the practices in dispute were incidental to the exercise of his rights
as a certified public accountant. See Chicago Bar Ass'n, 38 N.E.2d at 350. The court did not
squarely address this issue. See id.
Issues of lay practice before administrative agencies have arisen with respect to other
professions and occupations. In these cases the courts have similarly failed to examine the
underlying nature of the dispute or apply the incidental services test. See, e.g., Stack v. P.G.
Garage, Inc., 80 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1951) (holding that the appeal of real estate taxes to the
county tax board by a licensed realtor amounted to the practice of law); People ex rel. Trojan
Realty Co. v. Purdy, 162 N.Y.S. 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916) (holding that a corporation that
appealed real estate tax assessments before the tax board, a quasi judicial body, was engaged
in the practice of law).
124. See Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788, 796 (Minn. 1951).
125. See Zelkin v. Caruso Discount Corp., 9 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960);
Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619, 624 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1954).
126. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
127. See Agran, 273 P.2d at 623; Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 34 (Mass.
1943).
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Secondly, the courts have not made clear whether the difficulty of the
issue may arise from the tax law itself, or whether the difficulty must have its
genesis in a branch of non-tax law. The courts have refused to accept the
notion that the tax law is sui generis. Therefore, it would appear that the
courts would not limit the source of difficulty to non-tax law. Consequently,
assuming a proper understanding of the tax return process, the entire tax
return process would be off-limits to accountants - a position that belies
eighty years of experience and one that no court has ever entertained.128 If
non-tax law must be the root of the difficulty then this distinction among the
branches of law impliedly treats the tax law as sui generis. 129 As discussed
subsequently in this article, the interrelationship of tax law and other branches
of law should pose no special difficulty for certified public accountants
because existing professional standards will require the assistance of special-
ists, when needed. 30
C. Progress Toward Special Status
Three recent decisions have, to varying degrees, recognized the unique
professional status of certified public accountants, and have rejected arbitrary
distinctions. Ironically, none of the cases directly involve income tax prac-
tice.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has relatively recently had occasion to
weigh in on the propriety of accountants preparing inheritance tax
returns. 3 ' In 1972 the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law issued
Opinion No. 10. In that Opinion, the Committee concluded that the prepara-
tion of a New Jersey Inheritance Tax Return by a non-lawyer acting for
another would constitute the unauthorized practice of law.'32 New Jersey had,
by statute, created a line of demarcation between accounting and law as it
related to the filing of inheritance tax returns.'33 The Committee's conclusion
128. See infra notes 15 1-54 and accompanying text.
129. The conceptual confusion generated by this test is evident in Zelkin. In that case the
court either implied that non-tax law must be the source of the difficulty or was operating
with a fundamental misunderstanding of tax accounting. The court held that the plaintiff
"could be said to have been practicing law only if on the face of the problem which he was
negotiating no discussion of that problem would be possible without reference to legal issues
and no persuasive argument could be made which did not include a discussion of legal
principles." Zelkin, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 224. Every tax accounting issue requires a discussion of
legal principles for tax accounting is a statutory creation. Therefore, either the court failed to
see this or was limiting the legal issues to which it was referring to non-tax legal issues.
130. See infra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
131. See In re New Jersey Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants, 507 A.2d 711 (N.J. 1986).
132. Id. at 712.
133. The statute provided, inter alia, that no Inheritance Tax report will be accepted unless
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was rooted in the belief that the preparation of an inheritance tax return
"requires the application of a gamut of legal principles."' 34 In 1984 The New
Jersey Society of Certified Public Accountants ( NJCPA ) challenged
Opinion No. 10 and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the petition
for review. 35
The court, highlighting the difficulty in drawing a clear line between
the two professions with respect to tax practice, held that certified public
accountants may prepare inheritance tax returns, but that their clients must
be notified in writing, before commencing work on the return, that review of
the return by a qualified attorney may be desirable. 136 Thus, the court gave
express recognition to a special status for certified public accountants. How-
ever, the scope of this special status was mitigated by the notice requirement
imposed by the court.
The court reviewed the nature of the Inheritance Tax and concluded that
the "preparation of an Inheritance Tax Return is, in general, so dependent on
the estate is represented by an attorney at law of the State of New Jersey, the personal
representative of the estate, or certain testate or intestate successors of the decedent. See id.
at 713 n.2. The statute further provides that "[n]othing herein is intended to preclude the
discussion of accounting problems which may arise in the course of an audit of a New Jersey
Inheritance Tax report, with a Certified Public Accountant .... Under no circumstances may
a C.P.A. enter into discussions regarding any question of law." Id. (emphasis added). This
statute had its genesis in regulations promulgated after the issuance of Formal Opinion No.
19 by the Attorney General. See infra note 134.
134. In re New Jersey Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants, 507 A.2d at 712. The
Committee's conclusion was supported by a formal opinion of the Attorney General. The
Attorney General had previously ruled that preparation of inheritance tax returns by a person
not licensed to practice law and not acting as a representative of the estate would constitute
the unauthorized practice of law. See 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 146 (1955). This opinion, issued in
response to an inquiry from the State Treasurer, stated that inheritance tax returns prepared
by non-lawyers should not be accepted, effectively removing the State Treasurer's discretion
to accept such returns. See id. at 146-49. Formal Opinion No. 19 relied upon the general
statutory prohibition to the unauthorized practice of law and held that the State Treasurer, in
addition to the express authority to adopt rules to efficiently administer the Department of
Treasury, had the implied power to regulate the filing of returns so as to prevent such
unauthorized practice of law. See id.
135. See In re New Jersey Soc'y Certified Pub. Accountants, 507 A.2d 711 (N.J. 1986).
Several years earlier the New Jersey Society of Certified Public Accountants had requested
the Attorney General to review the statute at issue Formal opinion No. 19 but their request
was denied. See id. at 713.
136. Id. at 717. The court noted that such notification may be required by a certified
public accountant in order to meet her standard duty of care. In light of this duty of care it is
difficult to ascertain what the court has accomplished by setting out a notification requirement
other than precluding oral notification and use of professional discretion by certified public
accountants in determining whether an attorney's review is, in fact, desirable. Given the
court's assumption that "certified public accountants will be aware of the boundaries of their
own professional skills and will recommend consultation with counsel whenever ... legal
advice is desirable" a rigid notification requirement appears unnecessary. See id.
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the correct application of legal principles as to require this Court to exercise
its supervisory jurisdiction over the practice of law." 3 However, the court
also focused on the purpose of regulating the practice of law. The court re-
fused to "impose needlessly restrictive conditions that disserve the public
interest." 38 The court, in reaching its conclusion, appeared to be influenced
by several factors. First, the court noted the elaborate certification, admission,
and regulatory mechanisms in place that govern certified public accountants
practicing in New Jersey. Secondly, the court recognized that "the skills
possessed by a substantial number of certified public accountants" qualifies
them to prepare and file the returns in question.'3 9
The court did not provide a workable distinction between law and ac-
counting practice with respect to tax return preparation. The court did not
address petitioner's contention that the preparation of a return is an account-
ing function." 0 The court did find the notion that accounting "merely involves
the setting down of figures" as overly simplistic' 4 ' but did not attempt to pre-
cisely determine what tax accounting entails.
In The FloridaBar Re: Advisory Opinion - Nonlawyer Preparation of
Pension Plans,'4 2 the unauthorized practice of law committee of the Florida
Bar Association petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida to approve a formal
advisory opinion concerning non-lawyer preparation of employee pension
137. Id. at 716. Inheritance tax, like the federal estate tax, is levied on a tax base that is
balance sheet oriented. In other words, the tax base is defined with reference to property that
exists at a given point or points in time. Income tax is based on the activity of a taxpayer as
opposed to property holdings at a particular point in time. Consequently, the importance of
accounting issues is diminished. However, without undertaking a detailed analysis, it would
appear that the issues facing the tax practitioner in this area, from a doctrinal standpoint, are
within the expertise of the certified public accountant. Advice rendered must consider, inter
alia, the present and future financial impact upon the taxpayer and beneficiaries. Moreover,
traditional accounting skills such as the summarization, classification, recordkeeping, and
application of present value concepts will be involved. As a practical matter, because the
planning process often requires the drafting of documents attorneys are better positioned to
provide these services. Moreover, because the tax issues presented are unique to this area
attorneys drafting documents are more likely to be more familiar with the relevant tax issues
than attorneys drafting commercial documents. See generally Lawyers and Certified Public
Accountants: A Stud) of Interprofessional Relations, 36 TAX LAw. 26, 35-36 (1982) (reprinting
Statement on Estate Planning issued by the National Conference of Lawyers and Certified
Public Accountants in 1981).
138. In re New Jersey Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants, 507 A.2d at 716.
139. Id. at 717.
140. See id. at 715. The petitioners also put forth their right to practice before the Treasury
Department and the United States Tax Court as support for their position. Id. The court did
not address this issue. See supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
federal preemption issue.
141. In re New Jersey Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants, 507 A.2d at 715.
142. 571 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1990).
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plans. The proposed opinion categorized the various functions of pension
planning into those which may be performed by non-lawyers and those that
may not.'43 The court declined to approve the opinion. The court relied pri-
marily on Sperry federal preemption grounds. 4 4 Nevertheless, the court cited
approvingly to In re New Jersey Soc'y. of Certified Pub. Accountants.145
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has recently examined the proper
scope of certified public accountants' services. The South Carolina Bar had
submitted, through a special subcommittee of its Unauthorized Practice of
Law Committee, a comprehensive set of proposed rules governing the unau-
thorized practice of law. The proposed rules would have restricted the abil-
ity of laypersons, including certified public accountants, to practice before
state agencies and the Probate Court.
146
The court refused to adopt the proposed rules, expressing its preference
for resolution of such issues on a case by case basis and not through enforce-
ment of a comprehensive set of rules. 41 Moreover, in the strongest statement
to date regarding the status of certified public accountants, the court stated:
[O]ur respect for the rigorous professional training, certification and li-
censing procedures, continuing professional education requirements, and
ethical code required of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) convinces
us that they are entitled to recognition of their unique status .... We are
confident that allowing CPAs to practice in their areas of expertise, sub-
ject to their own professional regulation, will best serve to both protect
and promote the public interest. 4 '
V. ARGUMENTS FAVORING REMOVAL OF PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS
The necessity for consumer protection, the principle justification sup-
porting the law of unauthorized practice is based on three rationales - com-
petence, motivational, and remedial rationales. 49 The motivational rationale,
in my opinion, warrants no further discussion. 50 This section will address
143. Id. at 432.
144. Id. at 433. This case involved, in addition to Circular 230, 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (1988), a
provision contained in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub.
L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 841 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461).
145. The Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion, 571 So. 2d at 433.
146. The proposed rules also would have imposed restrictions upon certified public
accountants engaged in federal income tax practice.
147. In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by the South Carolina Bar, 422
S.E.2d 123, 124 (S.C. 1992).
148. Id. at 124-25.
149. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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whether restrictions on the practice of certified public accountants in the
income tax field are justified by the competence and remedial rationales.
A. Competence Rationale
Limitations on tax practice by certified public accountants cannot be
justified on competency grounds for two reasons. First, the tax law is, in
several respects, well suited for certified public accountants to master and
apply to client factual situations. In a sense, it may properly be viewed as sui
generis. Secondly, the historical role of certified public accountants in the
tax return preparation process provides ample evidence that an unfettered role
in tax practice is justified.
1. Tax Law as Sui Generis
The tax law, contrary to the position taken by the courts, is different than
other areas of law. It is similar to other law in that it is subject to the same
interpretive, analytical, and reasoning processes that lawyers use in other
areas of the law. However, it is distinguishable from other areas of law be-
cause its subject matter makes attempts to segregate accounting and legal
issues unworkable. The tax law concerns itself with issues that, in the words
of one authority, "revolve[] around timing and character."'
Income tax laws, by their very nature, define a tax base. In so doing, the
classification, measurement, and summarization processes cannot be divorced
from the law that makes these processes necessary. Moreover, in most cases,
it is the law that establishes the methodologies that are employed in perform-
ing these processes.1 2 The futility of efforts to draw clear borders between
the professions is evidenced by the inconsistent criteria employed to demar-
cate the professions' respective roles in tax practice.
Existing attempts to define the role of lawyers and accountants are
unworkable because they allocate the respective spheres of expertise using in-
consistent criteria. Accountants are assigned a role based on their substantive
151. Deborah Lohse, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1994, at AI (quoting Ed Klienbard
in the context of explaining hedging rules).
152. See, e.g., infra notes 192-211 and accompanying text. Recent legislation has introduced
several areas of tremendous methodogical complexity. Among the more noteworthy provisions
are Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41(a), 98 Stat. 532 (1984) (broadening
the applicability of the original issue discount rules); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 501, 100 Stat. 2233 (1986) (enacting the restrictions on the use of losses and
credits from passive activities); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-5 14, § 1201, 100
Stat. 2520 (1986) (providing additional restrictions through the creation of "baskets" of income
on the use of foreign tax credits).
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knowledge - a substantive criteria - while attorneys are assigned a role
based on their familiarity with the process of law - a procedural criteria.
53
For example, particular types of tax problems are oftentimes considered
within the accountants' area of expertise.1 54 The lawyer's domain becomes
exclusive when issues of non-tax law or difficult issues of interpretation come
into play. While reserving issues of non-tax law to the lawyer is, in my opin-
ion, appropriate and desirable, the reservation of interpretive difficulties in-
herent in the tax law to the bar is problematic. This position necessarily
implies that the substantive areas that are generally considered within the
accountant's domain involve no interpretative difficulty. However, as the tax
return illustrations presented below highlight, a familiarity with the relevant
statutes in the areas involved evidences that this assertion goes too far.
a. The problem of non-tax law
Admittedly, as the courts have recognized, the tax law is not a neat self-
contained body of law. 5 5 Much of the tax law will turn on legal relationships
and consequences that are determined by the application of non-tax federal or
state law. Although lawyer exclusivity over matters of non-tax law has not
been subject to serious challenge, the respective role of lawyers and accoun-
tants needs to be clarified in the event an issue of non-tax law presents itself
in an income tax context.
153. Procedural based criteria are also used to describe a certified public accountant's role.
Generally, such a role is deemed to encompass significant issues of classification and
summarization. However, it is difficult to reconcile this approach with the substance -
procedure approach described above. This difficulty arises because the tax law itself provides
the rules for such processes and, consequently, the procedurally defined scope is either
subsumed by the lawyer's role or a resort to substantive areas must be made.
154. See Austin, supra note 90, at 228-29 (stating that the determination of income may
present issues with respect to inventory pricing, accrual and installment accounting,
depreciation, and consolidated returns, among others ). The Gardner court cited this article
for the proposition that certain issues are properly resolved by accountants. See supra note
90 and accompanying text. The National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public
Accountants have also resorted to a similar method of reasoning. In attempting to define the
roles of the two professions with respect to federal income tax advice the Joint Statement
issued by the conferees asserts that problems raising "uncertainties as to the interpretation of
law, or uncertainties as to the application of law to the transaction involved..." may be best
referred to an attorney. The Joint Statement goes on to state that difficult issues of "classifying
and summarizing the transaction" are best handled by the certified public accountant. See
Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants: A Study of Interprofessional Relations, supra
note 137, at 34 (reprinting the National Conference's Statement on Practice in the Field of
Federal Income Taxation). Professor Bittker has, however, recognized the problem of
determining the proper role of the accountant by reference to particular types of issues. See
Bittker, supra note 42, at 186-87.
155. See Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788, 796 (Minn. 1951).
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An issue of non-tax law may present itself in one of two ways. First, the
transaction in question may involve issues that implicate non-tax law and
these issues have relevance separate and apart from the tax consequences. For
example, for tax purposes it may be desirable to liquidate a subsidiary tax-free
into its parent pursuant to I.R.C. section 332.56 Because, for purposes of
I.R.C. section 332, a merger of a subsidiary into its parent is treated in the
same manner as a liquidation' the choice between.a state law merger and
liquidation will turn on factors separate and distinct from the tax conse-
quences. This scenario presents a clear case for lawyer exclusivity.'
Consider, however, an example involving recently enacted I.R.C.
section 197.119 This provision provides that a taxpayer is permitted an amor-
tization deduction for any amortizable section 197 intangible. 60 Amortiza-
tion is determined by recovering the adjusted basis of the section 197 ratably
over a fifteen-year period.' 61 Excluded from the definition of amortizable sec-
tion 197 intangibles are, inter alia, interests in land 6 2  a term the statute
leaves undefined. 63 Until such time as regulations, rulings, or court decisions
provide guidance the exact scope of this term will depend on state law and
other federal law. For example, the determination of whether restrictive
covenants or equitable servitudes are interests in land for purposes of sec-
tion 197 may depend on state property law or analogy to other federal law such
as bankruptcy law. 164 Other examples requiring resort to non-tax law
156. I.R.C. § 332 applies to liquidations of 80% or more owned subsidiaries. See I.R.C. §
332(b)(1).
157. See Rev. Rul. 84-2, 1984-1 C.B. 92.
158. Other issues may involve a combination of tax and non-tax alternative outcomes - for
example, the decision to incorporate a business. These issues are analogous to those tax
issues that can only be resolved with recourse to non-tax law. See infra notes 159-65 and
accompanying text.
159. I.R.C. § 197 was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
160. I.R.C. § 197(a).
161. Id.
162. I.R.C. § 197(e)(2).
163. Life estates, remainder interests, easements, mineral rights, grazing rights, riparian
rights, air rights, and zoning variances fall within the scope of the statute. See STATEMENT
OF THE CONFERENCE MANAGERS FOR THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF TITLE XII1 OF THE
OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993, H.R. REP. No. 103-213, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) reprinted in THE REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993 (R.I.A. U.S. Tax Rep.
Supp. 1993).
164. Courts have had to resolve similar issues in the context of II U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
This provision provided a debtor in possession with the option to reject executory contracts.
The courts have had to determine whether certain types of covenants are executory contracts,
subject to rejection, or are real property interests that may not be rejected. See, e.g., In re
Case, 91 B.R. 102 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (holding a covenant that "runs with the land" to be
a real property interest).
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are easily found.165
This example, and others like it, represent the situation where the
application of tax law is dependent upon interpretation or analysis of non-tax
law. Clearly, the resolution of the non-tax issue is beyond the training of the
certified public accountant. However, nowhere has it been clearly stated just
where the accountants role ends. When faced with such an issue, must the
accountant relinquish her role in resolving the underlying tax issue or, alter-
natively, may the accountant seek legal advice on the non-tax issue while
retaining responsibility for the ultimate tax decision? It would appear that
no reason exists to require the accountant to relinquish her role entirely with
respect to the tax issue. The resolution of the non-tax matter may be seen as
analogous to the situation requiring the retention of an expert in other fields,
such as an appraiser or actuary. Moreover, the inability of certified public
accountants to draft documents serves to insure that a lawyer will have input
as to whether the tax advice given creates new, or exacerbates existing prob-
lems.
Professor Bittker has raised a more troublesome issue. He has had con-
cerns with respect to non-lawyers' ability to recognize that a non-tax issue
exists. Although recognizing that accountants and lawyers have advantages
over each other in certain areas, this problem is peculiar to accountants. Pro-
fessor Bittker put forth three examples of issues whose resolution would turn
on non-tax principles of law not mentioned in the tax literature. 66 Admittedly,
if this is a pervasive problem, then the certified public accountant's role in the
tax process may be properly circumscribed. However, I believe this type of
problem to be exceptional. Most interpretive difficulties arise from the appli-
cation of the tax law itself- pure tax law complexity. Secondly, many issues
of non-tax law are readily ascertainable. That is, the statute, regulations, or
decisional law will expressly reference the non-tax matter whose resolution
will determine the tax consequences. Burke and Treas. Reg. § 1.468B are two
such examples.167 In fact, some commentators have posited that the tremen-
dous complexity facing tax practitioners is a result of too much guidance.'6 8
165. For example, after United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992), the excludability
of damages awarded pursuant to certain federal antidiscrimination statutes under I.R.C. § 104
will depend, in part, on the remedial scheme employed by the statutes under which the claim
is made. See generally Arthur W. Andrews, The Taxation of Title VII Victims After the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 46 TAX LAW. 755 (1993). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-I(c)(2) (1994)
(providing that the use of a qualified settlement fund is limited to liabilities from claims
taking a particular form or arising under a particular statutory scheme).
166. See Bittker, supra note 42, at 187-88.
167. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. For example, Burke is amply discussed
in the tax services. See [1994] 2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 16662.03.
168. See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, "We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us "." More Thoughts
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Moreover, it is unclear whether lawyers, in general, have the breadth of
knowledge, at least to the degree that has been assumed, to recognize such
issues consistently. 6 9 The practice of law has gone in the direction of increas-
ing specialization and, in the case of tax law, subspecialization. 7 ° This
tendency to narrow the scope of one's professional expertise undermines, to
an extent, the argument that, relative to attorneys, accountants lack the nec-
essary breadth to do the job. Because I believe the recognition problem to be
atypical and, given the specialization of most tax attorneys, any advantage
accruing to attorneys in this respect is marginal.'
7
'
On Hyperlexis, 47 TAX LAW. 1 (1993) (decrying the tendency of tax practioners to demand
guidance from the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury as to the tax consequences of
virtually any transaction). Hyperlexis is a term defined by Bayless Manning in 1977 as a
"pathological condition caused by an overactive lawmaking gland." See id. at 2.
169. Professor Bittker has suggested, assuming that accountants continue to apply legal
principles and the appropriate professional organizations and the Treasury do not work to
change this practice, that accountants' training include a larger element of legal education.
See Bittker, supra note 42, at 188. The Uniform Certified Public Accountant Examination
includes a section on law related topics. This section tests knowledge in a variety of business
law areas including among others, contracts, sales, bankruptcy, agency, corporations, and
partnerships. See MARK E. ROXZKOWSKI, BUSINESS LAW FOR THE CPA CANDIDATE vii - viii
(1992). Moreover, most undergraduate accounting curriculums require at least one business
law course to be completed in order to earn a degree in accounting. My previous experience
as a practicing certified public accountant leads me to believe that non-tax law courses, with
respect to training a tax practitioner, are of marginal benefit to a person who has not attended
law school. This is because these courses are intended to provide a general level of knowledge
with respect to the nature and function of law and its relationship to business. In my opinion,
graduate courses in tax law provide far greater exposure to the legal subtleties that one will
encounter in tax practice.
170. On November 9, 1992 The American Bar Association adopted the American Bar
Association Standards For Accreditation Of Specialty Certification Programs For Lawyers.
These standards establish the authority to grant and withdraw accreditation of specialty
certification programs for lawyers in particular fields of law. Moreover, the standards require
that accrediting organizations demonstrate that lawyers certified by them possess enhanced
level of skill and expertise and involvement in a specialty area. As of July 1993 sixteen
states had adopted certification plans and an additional two states provide for specialist
designation. See SPECIALIZATION DESK BOOK 11-1 to 11-13 (A.B.A. 1993). Of these states,
7 recognize tax law as a specialty. In Louisiana tax law is the only specialty recognized.
Recognition of practice specialties began in earnest in the 1970s in response to the defacto
specialization that had already taken place. See id. at 1-1. The actual and potential effects
of increased specialization by the bar has produced much literature. See, e.g., Norman
Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV. 741, 743-44 (1988);
Marc Galanter and Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-To-Partner
Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747, 806-11 (1990). See
also REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL
PRACTITIONER AND THE ORGANIZED BAR 18-19 (July 1984). For an interesting view of the
changing nature of tax law practice see M. Bernard Aidinoff, et. al., Tax Lawyering:
A Changing Profession, 46 TAX LAW. 665 (1993) (collecting several short essays).
171. This is not to argue that real advantages do not exist to clients in retaining tax lawyers
that have such expertise. As in any field of endeavor, let alone law, not all practitioners are
created equally. Professor Bittker's views reflect, no doubt, his particular experiences and
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2. Tax Return Preparation as Evidence of Competency
The certified public accountant's role in the preparation of tax returns
has generated relatively little controversy. In fact, the accountant's role in
preparing income tax returns was a contributing factor in the growth of the
accounting profession in the twentieth century)7 2 At the federal level, it ap-
pears well settled that Circular 230 has provided an imprimatur immune on
Supremacy Clause grounds to any state law challenge." 3 In attempting to
define the boundaries between the legal and accounting professions, the courts
have not placed much evidentiary weight on the fact that certified public
accountants have been engaged in tax return preparation practice since the
founding of the profession. This reticence may be explained by the manner
in which the courts have viewed the tax return preparation process.
The discussion that follows posits that the courts operate under a funda-
mental nmsconception concerning the preparation of tax returns. Once the
nature and scopeof the tax return preparation process is understood it be-
comes apparent that a prohibition on the rendering of tax advice, unconnected
to the rendering of other services, cannot be rooted in competency grounds.'74
Moreover, if the level of complexity is the criteria for drawing a line of demar-
cation between the professions, a proper understanding of the tax return
level of expertise. He is a recognized giant in the field of federal income taxation. See
generally Elias Clark, Boris I. Bittker: Colleague and Friend, 93 YALE L.J. 199 (1983) (paying
tribute to Professor Bittker for a remarkable career).
172. The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by the
necessary number of states by the end of February 1913 is generally credited with ushering in
a period of unprecedented growth for the accounting profession. The Sixteenth Amendment
made possible the enactment of a broad based income tax in October of 1913, effective to
March 1, 1913, with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, 38 Stat. 114
(1913). A national franchise tax on corporations, using cash receipts as a base, enacted in
1909 also increased the need for accountant's services. See JAMES D. EDWARDS, HISTORY OF
PUBLIC ACCOUNTING IN THE UNITED STATES 93-104 (1960). See also 1 JOHN L. CAREY, THE
RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION, 67-71 (AICPA 1969); MARK STEVENS, THE BIG
EIGHT 139-140 (1984). The first federal income tax was enacted in 1862 in an effort to
finance the Civil War. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 2 (1988). Federal
tax legislation was also passed in 1864, 1870, and 1894. Id. For a brief discussion of the
history of the federal income tax see Graetz, at 2-6. The latter legislation was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429 (1895), (prompting efforts to amend the constitution), overruled by South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). Relatively few persons were subject to tax by these early statutes.
173. See supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
174. Using tax return preparation practice as evidence of a broad level of competency in
tax law presupposes that the tax returns are being prepared competently. I have not engaged
in any empirical research concerning the quality of tax returns prepared by certified public
accountants as compared to those prepared by attorneys or other professional group. However,
I know of no studies or literature that would tend to dispel the fact that certified public
accountants have prepared returns competently over the years.
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preparation process would result in almost all income tax returns of business
enterprises being considered complex, and consequentially, not within the
accountant's proper scope of services. This assertion belies historical expe-
rience and accepted business practices.175
Courts in cases presenting unauthorized practice of law issues'7 6 have
generally categorized tax return preparation as clerical in nature. 77 This view,
simplistic to say the least, is not the result of any reasoned examination of the
175. Moreover, it is possible that tax return preparation is a service most attorneys would
rather not engage in. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 36 (reporting a consensus among attorneys
that unauthorized law practice is not perceived as an economic threat because, inter alia,
much of the work is that which attorneys do not want).
176. The nature of the tax preparation process has also been the expounded upon in cases
dealing with the attorney-client privilege. Several circuits have held that the attorney-client
privilege does not attach to communications incident to the preparation of tax returns because
the nature of the tax return preparation service is not a legal service but clerical one. See,
e.g., In re Grand jury Investigation of Glen J. Schroeder, Jr., 842 F.2d 1223 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(holding that preparation of a tax return is not a legal service); United States v. Davis, 636
F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981) (holding that, although
some knowledge of the law is required, preparation of a tax return is primarily an accounting
service); United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that consultations
with an attorney for the purpose of preparing tax returns are not privileged and, by its choice
of citation, implicitly equating tax return preparation with the preparation of a net worth
statement). Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966) (adopting the
reasoning of the trial court that filling out tax returns is scrivener's work). Cf. Colton v.
United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States
v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925
(E.D. Ky. 1962). In Summe, the court clearly refused to accept the notion that tax return
matters were somehow less demanding than other legal matters faced by attorneys. This is
important because it tends to dispel any question that the court's view was premised on a
Gardner type analysis. For a detailed analysis of attorney-client privilege in the tax return
context see Bruce Graves, Attorney Client Privilege in Preparation of Income Tax Returns:
What Every Attorney-Preparer Should Know, 42 TAX LAW. 577 (1989).
177. See, e.g., In re New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 220 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1948) (stating that preparation of the return was clerical process); In re Larson, 485
N.W.2d 345, 350 (N.D. 1992) (stating, without providing any reasoning, that a suspended
attorney may prepare tax returns, which the court considered a "tax accounting" service, in a
location where the suspended attorney is not known as a lawyer); In Agran v. Shapiro, 273
P.2d 619 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1954), the court conceded that preparation of tax returns
is within the accountant's domain but then retreated from providing a categorical treatment
of tax returns by stating that a possible exception exists where substantial questions of law
are involved. Presumably, this is a form of the Gardner test applied to tax return preparation.
Other courts have drawn a distinction between simple and complex returns, either expressly
or by implication. The fact that the courts would make such a distinction would appear to
imply that the courts regard certain tax returns as involving more than scrivener or clerical
work. Unfortunately, no analysis was provided to highlight the courts' insight into the nature
of the tax return process. See, e.g., State v. Willenson, 123 N.W.2d 452, 454 n.3 (Wis. 1963)
(citing secondary sources for the proposition that tax returns of a simple nature are within the
domain of laypersons); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 34 (Mass. 1943) (holding
that, based on the simplicity of the tax returns in question, the respondent was not engaged in
the practice of law).
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tax return process but is posited in a conclusory fashion. One could reason-
ably conclude that this view of the tax return process stems from the same type
of circular reasoning that is found in certain definitions of law practice. That
is, because they are typically prepared by accountants tax returns do not in-
volve difficult questions of law.'
Some courts, particularly those that have adopted the Gardner test, have
expressed the notion that there is a distinction among tax returns. This dis-
tinction is based on the difficulty of preparing the returns in question.7 9
However, in these cases the courts appear to treat the complex return as the
exceptional or unusual case, which, in my opinion, evidences a failure to
understand the nature of the tax return process. 180 Moreover, the courts, in
giving weight to the complexity of the tax return at issue, are implicitly
subscribing to the notion that only simple returns may be prepared by
accountants.
Any attempt to categorize services rendered in connection with tax
return preparation as legal or accounting in nature will lead, at best, to a
conclusory opinion as to what services are best performed, or should be per-
formed, by each profession. The nature of the tax return preparation process,
inextricably meshing law and accounting, may be illustrated by two examples.
The examples chosen are the procedures necessary to determine tax deprecia-
tion and amortization'' deductions and liabilities properly accrued for tax
purposes.
1. Illustration of the Tax Return Process
I have chosen the two items referred to above for purposes of illustration
because they are ubiquitous in the preparation of income tax returns. These
178. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(1)(1980) contradicts this view of the tax return
preparation process. This provision provides that a tax return preparer includes anyone who
furnishes information and advice "so that completion of the return ... is largely a mechanical
or clerical matter .. " Moreover, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(d)(1) categorically excludes
persons providing typing, reproduction, or other mechanical assistance from the definition of
a tax return preparer. Therefore, the "mere scrivener" categorization is expressly rejected by
the Treasury Department.
179. See supra note 120.
180. Whether the determination of whether a return is complex is made by examining
whether substantial questions of law exist or by some other factor that correlates with
complexity, the courts have failed to consider that all but a fraction of non-individual returns
and many individual returns will be complex. A thorough understanding of the process would
highlight the futility of such an approach.
181. Depreciation is often used to refer to the periodic cost recovery of tangible assets.
Amortization is often used to refer to the periodic cost recovery of intangible assets. For
purposes of this article I use the word depreciation to describe the cost recovery of both
tangible and intangible assets.
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examples are representative of situations that confront the certified public
accountant consistently in a tax return preparation practice. They are not
atypical. These issues, and others presenting similar difficulties, are perva-
sive in the preparation of an income tax return of a business entity of any
substance. 8 2 As discussed subsequently, the tax return preparer encounters
six distinct types of problems in preparing tax returns. The variety of skills
necessary to resolve these problems should provide comfort to those question-
ing the competency of tax return preparers to venture into other areas of tax
practice.
Labeling tax return preparation as mechanical, clerical, or some other
such term is grossly inaccurate. It is based on the image of a tax return as a
finished product with its numbers representing a taxable years worth of activ-
ity neatly summarized. However, "[tihe danger of images lies not in the in-
formation they carry but rather in our propensity to believe. . . that we have
seen the whole picture."' 83 Perhaps this view of the process is grounded, in
part, on stereotypical notions about the role of accountants. 8 4 A better
explanation may be found in the distinction between tax planning and com-
pliance work.
182. Moreover, this article does not present, by way of example, issues attendant to broad
areas of the tax law that have no counterpart whatsoever in generally accepted accounting
principles. For example, the taxation of partnerships and foreign subsidiaries owned by
United States persons present issues and concepts that are completely irrevelant from a
financial accounting perspective. Because a partnership is not a taxpaying entity much of the
complexity inherent in this area stems from rules that affect the allocation of items to the
partners. For example, the rules dealing with the allocation of income and losses to partners
and the allocation of partnership debt among the partners for basis purposes are lengthy and,
in some parts, of byzantine complexity. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1 & 1.704-2
(1991); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-IT (1991); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-0 - 1.752-5 (1993).
For financial accounting purposes these issues are largely irrevelant. For financial
accounting purposes the domicile of an entity is irrevelant to whether it is consolidated with
its affiliates. Geography is relevant only insofar as it may effect segment reporting or currency
translation. For tax purposes, a veritable maze of rules exist to determine when the income
of a foreign entity is subject to United States taxation. See, e.g., 1.R.C. §§ 551-558 (dealing
with the taxation of foreign personal holding companies); I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (providing the
taxing scheme for controlled foreign corporations); I.R.C. §§ 1291-1297 (dealing with the
taxation of passive foreign investment companies). Moreover, very complex rules exist to
mitigate the potential of multiple taxation due to the multiple jurisdictions that may have
claim to the earnings of the entity. See generally I.R.C. §§ 901-908 (providing detailed rules
with respect to the foreign tax credit). For a general overview of the United States taxation
of foreign entities and the foreign tax credit see JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, B2-1 to B3-159, B4-1 to B4-287 (WG&L 1992).
183. Paul Gray, Looking at Cataclysms, TIME, Aug. 1, 1994, at 64.
184. The illusion that tax return preparation is principally a clerical process may be rooted,
historically, to the early years of the accounting profession before the complexity of the
income tax laws increased exponentially. Moreover, prior to the advent of the personal
computer and its embrace by the profession, a good deal of time was, perhaps, spent in
gathering, summarizing, and classifying data.
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Tax compliance, or tax return work, is performed expost. The transac-
tions that must be reported have already taken place. If the assumption is
made that most tax issues are resolved ex ante then the clerical, mechanical
view of tax return preparation may be justified. However, most issues are not
resolved ex ante. There are several reasons for this. Many transactions, for
example, do not warrant examination ex ante because the expense of doing so
is preclusive. Alternatively, certain expenditures may be necessary despite
the tax consequences. Moreover, significant transactions that have been ex-
amined ex ante are often resolved at a macro level. For example, a transac-
tion may be examined to assure it qualifies as a tax free reorganization or that
certain provisions do or do not apply. The detailed application of the relevant
statutes and regulations is often left to the tax return preparer.
a. Depreciation
Depreciation is, I venture to say, an area that most tax practitioners
would consider to be within the accountant's sphere of expertise - perhaps
exclusively so. In order to properly report depreciation deductions, a process
of aggregation, classification, and calculation will be necessary - activities
well within the traditional role of a certified public accountant. Moreover, in
opining upon the financial statements, a similar process has already taken
place." 5 However, a description or analysis of the tax return preparation
process cannot conclude at this point.
The process of aggregating, classifying, and calculating incident to a
determination of the tax return depreciation deduction is very similar, as a
process, to the procedures required to determine depreciation expense for
financial accounting purposes. The substantive work, however, depends to a
great extent on obtaining a working knowledge of a bewildering array of stat-
utes, regulations, administrative pronouncements, and case law.'1 6 By sub-
stantive work, I mean the reasons why transactions are aggregated and clas-
sified in a particular manner and the methodology employed in calculating a
final result. It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a discussion, or even
185. The amount of work performed during the course of an audit with respect to any given
account or group of accounts will depend on the scope of the audit procedures employed and
the level of assistance given by the client's personnel. Statistical sampling is often employed
and, in cases where such techniques are employed, as few as 5% of transactions may be
examined. For a detailed discussion of statistical sampling in an audit context see I AICPA
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU l 350.03 - 350.47 (1985). Moreover, even in cases
where extensive analysis of an account or group of accounts are made generally accepted
accounting principles may differ from tax accounting rules.
186. A partial listing of the I.R.C. provisions that may be implicated include §§ 162, 163,
167, 168, 197, 263, 263A & 1274.
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a listing of all the issues that may arise with respect to depreciation.8 7 A
sampling of the issues that frequently arise, however, will highlight the futility
of attempts to categorize the entire tax preparation process into one nice neat
category.
The tax return preparer will confront six broad types of problems in
deriving a tax depreciation figure. The types of problems to which I am
referring are categorized using a process oriented typography. In other words,
the focus of attention will be placed on the type of skills necessary to solve
particular substantive tax issues, and not on the substantive tax issues them-
selves. The skills required to properly solve these problems are varied. The
problems that confront the tax preparer should fall within the Gardner court's
definition of difficult and, moreover, belie any notion that the application of
legal principles is incidental to the preparation of tax returns.
The first set of problems involves the data gathering, summarization, and
classification. The procedures incident to completing these tasks involved at
this stage are well suited for the accountant to perform. The exact procedures
that are necessary will vary from enterprise to enterprise but examples of
typical procedures would include an analysis of general ledger activity within
certain accounts and an examination of source documentation such as in-
voices, requisitions, and the like.
The second type of problem encountered is the application of a simple
legal concept whose resolution is heavily fact intensive. I call this the simple
legal - factually complex type of problem. The classic presentation of this
issue is the question of whether an expenditure is properly expensed or capi-
talized. 188 Section 263(a) denies a deduction for amounts that are properly
chargeable to a capital account. Included within ambit of section 263(a) are
amounts expended for the acquisition of "new buildings or for permanent
improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or
estate."' 8 9 In addition, amounts expended in restoring property or in making
good the previously deducted exhaustion of that property must be capital-
ized. 19 The Supreme Court has held that expenditures must be capitalized if
they either create a separate and distinct asset or if they provide a significant
long-term benefit.'
187. For a comprehensive treatment of depreciation see Depreciation: MACRS and ACRS,
531 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1994); Depreciation: General Concepts; Non-ACRS Rules, 530 Tax
Mgmt. (BNA).
188. This issue is also present for financial statement purposes and, in the easy cases, will
resolve itself at this stage.
189. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(a)(I) (1992).
190. I.R.C. § 263(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-l(a)(2) (1992).
191. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
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The concept is simple. 192 Has a separate and distinct asset been acquired
or created or does the expenditure have future utility? Ironically, at its core
this issue is one of the most basic of accounting issues and, in a sense, is
analogous to the situation presented in Zelkin, where the constructive receipt
doctrine was involved. 93 The easy cases - those involving the acquisition
of an identifiable or distinct tangible asset - pose little difficulty. The tough
cases involve expenditures that, at first glance, appear to be properly classi-
fied as a repair or maintenance expense. The question that must be answered
with respect to these expenditures is whether they have future utility. An
answer to this question will require a close examination of all the facts
surrounding the expenditure and a thorough knowledge of how the Internal
Revenue Service has ruled and what the courts have held in situations present-
ing similar fact patterns.'94
192. Statutory complexity does arise with respect to this issue due to the application of the
uniform capitalization rules imposed by I.R.C. § 263A. Closely related to the expense versus
capitalization issue, these rules provide for the capitalization of certain direct and indirect
costs to inventory produced or acquired and certain other property produced by the taxpayer.
The application of these rules requires a two step process. First, capitalizable costs must be
identified. Second, these costs must be allocated to the ending inventory or other property at
issue. The first step involves the application of basic cost accounting principles, although the
costs that must be capitalized are defined by regulation rather than by full absorption accounting
theory. Cost accounting is, by its nature, mechanically complex. See generally L. GAYLE
RAYBURN, COST ACcOUNTING (5th ed. 1993). However, these regulations provide an
additional layer of complexity. This additional complexity is caused by the various methods
of allocation that are available to a taxpayer with no counterpart in generally accepted
accounting principles. For an analysis of the uniform capitalization rules see Uniform
Capitalization Rules, 2-2nd Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1992).
193. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
194. Certain patterns or themes have emerged from the multitude of rulings and court
holdings dealing with this issue. For example, expenditures incurred to make property suitable
for a new use must be capitalized. See, e.g., United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686 (10th Cir.
1968) (holding that expenditures incurred as a part of a general plan to adapt property for a
new use must be capitalized); California Casket Co. v. Comm'r, 19 T.C. 32 (1952) (requiring
that costs incurred to convert a warehouse to a factory be capitalized). Likewise, expenditures
that materially enhance the useful life of an asset or increase its fair market value must be
capitalized. See, e.g., Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 640 (1973) (holding that
the cost to repair railroad cars must be capitalized because the expenditures in question served
to increase the useful lives of the cars); Hudlow v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M (CCH) 894 (1971)
(requiring that forklift repair costs be capitalized because the repairs performed extended the
useful life of the trucks and increased their market value). Whether an expenditure increases
the value of an asset or extends its useful life is determined by comparing the value or life of
the asset before the event or events that necessitated the repairs occurred with its post repair
value or useful life. See Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
Otherwise, any routine maintenance work would be captured by this test. Moreover,
expenditures that individually would fail to meet this test for capitalization may nevertheless
be capitalized if they are part of an overall plan of renovation or rehabilitation. See Ruttenberg
v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 370 (1986). For a thorough analysis of the repair versus
capital expenditure issue see Deductions Limitations: General, 504 Tax Mgmt. A-43 - A-59
(BNA) (1993).
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Accounting theory, while useful to obtaining a grasp on the issue, will
prove relatively useless in resolving the difficult cases. This is because for
purposes of applying generally accepted accounting principles, the determi-
nation of whether an expenditure should be capitalized will be influenced by
the matching principle and the concept of conservatism.' 95 For tax purposes
the matching principle, while relevant, is not a necessary condition for capi-
talization treatment 196 and the conservatism concept is irrelevant, if not dia-
metrically opposed to bedrock tax principles. 19 This lack of congruence
between accounting and tax principles is underscored by the uncertainty gen-
erated by INDOPCO. The second prong of the INDOPCO test - whether an
expenditure has future utility - is a classic matching concept issue. Ironi-
cally, however, it is this issue that has caused the greatest consternation and
anxiety among tax practitioners. 9 The tax preparer may well be guided by
accounting theory, but may be on firmer ground if she examined the issue with
a touch of Holmesian realism and anticipate how the courts may decide the
issue. 199
195. The matching principle is the term used for the principle that expenditures should be
charged to income in the period or periods in which related revenue is generated. Expenditures
that create an asset yield a benefit over several years and are recovered systematically through
an allocation procedure - depreciation and amortization, for example. See FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 6, ELEMENTS OF
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 50-52 (1985). Conservatism is a fundamental accounting concept
that represents "a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainties and risks
inherent in business situations are adequately considered. Thus, if two estimates of amounts
to be received or paid in the future are about equally likely, conservatism dictates using the
less optimistic estimate .. " FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 2 QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING
INFORMATION 40 (1980).
196. In Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-25 I.R.B. 4, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that
expenditures incurred in connection groundwater and soil remediation activities not involving
the construction of tangible property were currently deductible. This ruling expressly endorsed
the matching principle but also asserted that I.R.C. § 263A applies in the case where tangible
equipment is acquired despite the fact that the waste disposal practices that necessitated the
remediation have been discontinued - circumstances where the matching principle would be
violated. For a discussion of § 263A see supra note 192.
197. In contrast to the principle of conservatism tax deductions are deemed a matter of
legislative grace. See Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943); Helvering
v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934).
198. The Internal Revenue Service has sent out mixed signals as to whether it will use the
INDOPCO precedent with a modicum of restraint or as a bludgeon to require capitalization of
many expenditures heretofore treated as period costs. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-C.B.
57 (ruling that INDOPCO will not affect the treatment of advertising costs as deductible
business expenses under § 162); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-400-04 (June 29, 1992) (ruling that asbestos
removement costs had to capitalized because, inter alia, of the future health benefits that
would result). See also Peter L. Faber, Indopco: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAW. 607
(1994);
199. In attempting to answer the question "what constitutes the law" Holmes, viewing the
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A third type of problem is presented by issues that, by their very nature,
are complex. I call this type of issue the statutorily complex problem.200
Several examples of this type of problem are presented in connection with the
calculation of tax depreciation. For instance, depreciation must be calculated
for purposes of determining alternative minimum taxable income so that
liability for the alternative minimum tax, if any, may be determined. 10' In fact,
in the case of corporations, two separate depreciation calculations must be
made in order to calculate alternative minimum taxable income.2 The alter-
native minimum tax is, to a great extent, a tax imposed on a second tax base.
The tax base is derived from taxable income and adjusted upward or down-
ward by certain statutorily defined items and, increased by statutory items of
tax preference. The alternative minimum tax scheme, contained in five I.R.C.
sections 20 3 is fraught with definitions, 204 percentage limitations and phase-
outs, 2°5 elections, 206 and its interstices are conceptually difficult to master.
law through the eyes of a bad man, dismissed the importance of axioms and deductions and
stated that "[tihe prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law .. " Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 461 (1897).
200. For convenience I use the expression "statutorily complex" to include problems or
issues rendered complex by regulation or administrative pronouncement in addition to those
problems involving the application of a complex statute.
201. The alternative minimum tax scheme was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, § 701, Pub. L. No. 99-5 14, 100 Stat. 2320 (1986). A detailed analysis of the alternative
minimum tax is beyond the scope of this work. For a thorough analysis and historical overview
of the alternative minimum tax see Alternative Minimum Tax, 288-4th Tax Mgmt. (BNA)
(1989).
202. All taxpayers are required to adjust taxable income for depreciation deductions in
calculating alternative minimum taxable income. The adjustment is made by calculating
depreciation under the alternative depreciation system of § 168(g) and substituting the 150%
declining balance method for certain property. See I.R.C. § 56(a)(1). Certain elections
available in calculating depreciation for regular tax purposes may affect the calculations
necessary in determining depreciation for alternative minimum tax purposes. See I.R.C. §
168(b)(3)(D) (providing for the election of the straight line method for certain property
otherwise eligible to use a more accelerated method); I.R.C. § 56(a)(1)(A) (stating that the
adjustment to taxable income provided therein does not apply if the straight line method is
used for regular tax purposes). In the case of corporations a second calculation must be made
for purposes of determining adjusted current earnings. 1.R.C. § 56(c)(1). Adjusted current
earnings are determined by adjusting alternative minimum taxable income for certain statutorily
provided items. See I.R.C. § 56(g)(1). In essence, a second tier adjustment is mandated.
Depreciation is one of items that requires adjustment. See I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(A).
203. See I.R.C. §§ 55-59. In addition, § 53 provides a credit against the regular tax liability
for minimum tax liability paid in prior years attributable to certain adjustments. The credit is
intended to allow a credit for minimum tax liability caused by timing differences between the
two taxing systems but is somewhat broader in effect.
204. See I.R.C. §§ 55(c)(1); 56(d)-(e);
205. See I.R.C. §§ 55(d)(3); 56(d)(1)(A); 59(a)(2)(A).
206. See I.R.C. § 59(e).
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A second example of a statutorily complex provision affecting deprecia-
tion is the restrictions applicable to listed property. Listed property is defined
as any passenger automobile; other property used as means of transportation;
property generally used for purposes of entertainment, recreation, or amuse-
ment; computers and peripherals; cellular telephones and similar equipment;
and any other property specified by regulations.2 °7 The significance of prop-
erty being classified as listed property is that annual depreciation deductions
for certain of such property is limited to an amount provided by statute 2°8 and
further limitations are placed on depreciation in cases where the business use
of the asset fails to exceed 50 percent of total use.20 9 Moreover, detailed
recordkeeping requirements are imposed upon taxpayers in order to support
business usage of the asset in question. 2 10 The regulations implementing
section 280F are of Byzantine complexity. Various tables are provided in
order to apply the rules to leased assets.2 11 It is noteworthy that these rules
have no conceptual counterpart in the body of generally accepted accounting
principles.
A fourth type of issue that confronts the tax return preparer is the am-
biguous statute. In many cases it is just not clear what a statute means or
whether it applies to a particular factual situation. Ambiguities will generally
exist with respect to recently enacted provisions because the Internal Revenue
Service and the courts have not had the opportunity to resolve, or provide
guidance on, the issue or issues at hand. 12 Section 197 provides several
examples of ambiguity created by new legislation.
Section 197, enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993213, provides that a taxpayer is permitted an amortization deduction for
any amortizable section 197 asset. 214 The amortization deduction is deter-
207. I.R.C. § 280F(d)(4)(A).
208. See I.R.C. § 280F(a)(l)(A) (providing limits on the annual depreciation deduction for
passenger automobiles). The annual limitation is annually adjusted for inflation, as measured
by the CPI automobile component. See I.R.C. § 280F(d)(7).
209. If property is not predominately used in a qualified business use then depreciation
must be determined under the alternative depreciation system provided for under § 168(g).
See I.R.C. § 280F(b).
210. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(e)(l)-(2) (1992).
211. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.280F-5T (1993). The objective of these rules is to adjust a
taxpayer's lease expense in order to place leased assets subject to § 280F in a rough parity
with taxpayer owned assets.
212. Ambiguities are not, however, found exclusively in relatively recent provisions. See
infra notes 237-39.
213. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
214. I.R.C. § 197(a). A detailed analysis of § 197 is beyond the scope of this work. For a
thorough analysis and historical background see STATEMENT OF CONFERENCE MANAGERS
FOR THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF TITLE X111 OF THE OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION
[Vol. I11
46
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 11 [1995], Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol11/iss1/2
INCOME TAX PRACTICE AND CPAs
mined by amortizing the adjusted basis of the section 197 asset ratably over
a period of fifteen years."1 5 Property subject to section 197 is treated, for all
purposes of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, as property which is of
a character subject to depreciation under section 167.216 Included in the
definition of amortizable section 197 assets are goodwill and going concern
value. 21 7 One of the purposes of the enactment of section 197 was to place
goodwill and going concern value on equal footing with other intangible as-
sets to eliminate the excessive litigation that had arisen prior to its enactment.
However, various statutory and regulatory provisions, predating the enact-
ment of section 197, identify goodwill and going concern value for special
treatment, arguably contrary to the spirit of section 197 or the applicable
provision in question. 218
The fifth type of issue involves questions that require the exercise of
professional judgment. Judgment is an attribute that is required only where
a choice among alternative courses of action is available. The various elec-
tions available to the taxpayer, made with the filing of the income tax return,
with respect to depreciation are a good example of issues calling for the ex-
ercise of judgment.2 9 The decision whether to make a particular election will
be influenced, inter alia, by predictions concerning the future tax liabilities
ACT OF 1993, H.R. REP. 103-213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) reprinted in THE REVENUE
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993 (R.I.A. U.S. Tax Rep. Supp. 1993); Jack S. Levin & Donald
E. Rocap, A Transactional Guide To New Section 197, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 224-86, Nov. 1,
1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file.
215. I.R.C. § 197(a).
216. I.R.C. § 197(f)(7).
217. I.R.C. § 197(d)(I)(A)-(B).
218. For example, I.R.C. § 1060 applies in certain cases only when goodwill and going
concern value may attach to a group of assets. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(b)(2)
(1988). Because § 197 has separately defined various types of intangible assets, such as
workforce in place or customer based intangibles, that have traditionally been subsumed
within goodwill or going concern value it is questionable whether the application of § 1060
should be limited to acquisitions where goodwill and going concern may attach. Of course,
this assertion is premised on the fact that goodwill and going concern value are similarly
defined for purposes of §§ 197 and 1060 - a premise that is fraught with its own ambiguity.
An analogous issue is presented by Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(2) (1991). This provision
categorically denies like-kind exchange treatment for goodwill and going concern value.
219. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 59(e)(allowing the taxpayer the option to amortize certain
expenditures over a 10 year period for alternative minimum tax purposes); I.R.C. § 168(b)(5)
(providing for an election to use the straight-line method of depreciation for certain property);
I.R.C. § 168(g)(7) (providing for an election to use the alternative depreciation system for
regular tax purposes); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §
13,261(g)(2)(A), 107 Stat. 312, 540 (1993) (providing the taxpayer with an election to early
apply § 197). The importance and pervasiveness of elective provisions is evidenced by the
fact that an entire treatise is devoted to them. See generally MICHAEL B. LANG & COLLEEN
A. KHOURY, FEDERAL TAX ELECTIONS (WG&L 1991).
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of the client, administrative convenience, and effects on third parties,220
Finally, the last type of issue present is the actual calculation of the
deduction. This is the most mechanical phase of the process, It shold be
apparent that the complexity that is an inevitable consequence of the volume
of law in this area is in no way limited to arithmetic messiness, In fact, with
the proliferation of tax preparation software, the arithmetic is usually the least
of an accountant's concern. 2 '
b. Liability Accruals
The determination of whether liabilities should be accrued for ta4 pur-
poses presents, i..e depreciation, issues that are gencrally thought of as ac-
counting in nature 2 2 To b siure, the entire area is premised on the matching
principle 22 1 and a ajor portion o preparation 4nd examination of fiopn-
cial statements will involve accrued li4bilties. 4 Although the relative
220, For example, the election to adopt cerrain depreciation methods will he influenced bythe fact that these methods may avoid the administrative expense of calculating depreciation
upder a ecolad method. Moreover, Qerain elections will hind third parties to a particular ta
tre.atment of certain items, For example, the election to apply § 197, discussed at supri note219, will bind oll taxpayers under common control with the electing t nipoyer to the same
treatment. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, .supr note 219, § 3,261 (g)(2)(B).
221, The fact that much of :nTimber crunChing" i5 performOe by tax preparation softwaredoes not, Jn any way dirinish the need for a working knowldge of the present law, Forexample, the appropriate classification of property mnjt bc made by the preparer, Moreover,
various eleetions are available to taxpayers, These elections will require analysis as to theprobable tax consequences that will follow the making of an election or the failure to do so,
See, e.g., 1,R.C, § (O)(5) (providing for an electioq to subtjitule the 150 perce.n decliningbalance method for the 200 percent de¢lining balance on certain cases); I.RC, 0 168(f)(1)(allowing an election to exclude property from the modified accelerated depreciation system
if depreciation would otherwise be properly calculated under a uits of production or similar
method); I.R.C, § .168(s)(7) (poicl0ing the txpoyer an option to elect the Applicacion of theAlternative Depreciation System for regular tax purpose), For a brief discus son) of the
computer usage in tax return preparation practice see Thomas W, loglund & SUm A, Hick5,Computer Usage and Tax Sofiware I! q T(!., Pr!-0ct!ej AICPA TaY Divsl.ip; Srvey ReNyls'u
1994 TAX ADVISER 446 (,luly 1994),
222. Most income tax returns prepared for business en trprises will he prepared on the
accrual basis of accounting, Mot corporations are prohihitgd fromP Computing their lncoqme
on the cash basis method of accounting, $ge .,R,C, § 448(a)(j), Exception qrg maide for
certain qualified personal service corporations and corporations with Ies than $ 5,000,000 in
average annual gross receipts during a predetermined bose year period, Sae 1,R,C, 1§ 440(b)(2),
448(c). Moreover, use of the cash biisis .myehod of accounting is precluded for #ny tr"dp orbusiness in which inventorie. are present, $oe Trees, 1e% g .446,1J(c)(2) (1992),
223. See rupra note 195.
224. The. principle of conservatism places great e.phasis, in a;' audit gonext, onl thp sgAr.hfor unrecorded liabilities possibly as much or greater emphasi than is lven to eXAmlnln$
recorded liabilities. $4;e supra note 195.
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importance or prevalence of the issues may vary, the same six types of issues
will confront the tax preparer as she encountered in the depreciation con-
text.1
25
The data gathering, summarization, and classification work related to the
determination of tax accruals is relatively uncomplicated. An examination of
financial accounting accruals will, typically, be the starting point in the pro-
cess. Because of the conservatism principles much of the analysis will focus
on whether liabilities accrued for financial reporting purposes should be simi-
larly accrued for tax purposes.2 26
The second type of issue, the simple legal - factually complex problem,
surfaces with respect to the all events test. The all events test requires that,
before a liability is properly accrued, all the events have occurred that estab-
lish the fact of the liability and the amount of the liability may be determined
with reasonable accuracy. 22 The economic performance rules have, to an
extent, minimized the importance of the all events test.2 28 However, the
225. The timing of tax accruals is relevant not only for purposes of determining the timing
of deductions but also in determining whether an item is properly capitalized at a given point
in time. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(B) (1992). Conceptually, the determination of
proper tax accruals is more difficult than the determination of tax depreciation. That is
because the allowance of a deduction is fraught with exceptions and special rules depending
upon the type of taxpayer that is involved or the nature of the expenditure. In essence, the
relevance of when an item is incurred is dependent upon whether the item is deductible at all.
The complexity inherent in this area is evidenced by the fact that 14 pages were required in
one work to provide a table of contents. See Deductions: Overview and Conceptual Aspects,
503 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1994).
226. A major focus in the financial accounting process will include a search for unrecorded
liabilities. Typically, the procedures performed in such a search will include a review of
events and transactions occurring after the accrual date, review of various types of source
documentation and inquiries of client personnel and outside advisors who may possess relevant
information. For tax purposes, a review of these procedures could reveal liabilities that have
not been accrued for accounting purposes but should be accrued for tax purposes.
227. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1992). Not all liability accruals are subject to the all
events test. Certain items have their own unique requirements. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-
l(a)(2)(iii) (1992) (referring to various other provisions as governing the timing of certain
deductions).
228. The economic performance rules, contained in I.R.C. § 461(h), were enacted by Pub.
L. No. 98-369, § 9 1(a), 98 Stat. 598 (1984). These rules do not displace the all events test but
provide, in the case of certain liabilities, that the all events test shall not be met any earlier
than the time economic performance occurs. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(1). The rules work, in
general, to deny the accrual of a liability until certain events occur. The triggering events
depend upon the nature of the liability in question. In general, the rules categorize liabilities
as payment or service liabilities and require actual payment or the provision or receipt of
services, respectively, before a liability may be accrued. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(2). Ironically,
these rules require a major departure from generally accepted accounting principles with
respect to payment liabilities - tort claims, for example - while at the same time providing
for an exception for certain items that is based, in part, on the application of the matching
principle. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(3)(A)(iv)(II).
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former rules have not eliminated the application of the latter and, in many
cases economic performance issues will substitute for those issues previously
arising under the all events test.
The concept, relatively simple to understand, is closely related to the
standards applied in a financial accounting context in order to determine
whether a liability should be recorded.229 However, the all events test is much
more rigid and formalistic. Whether the incurrence of a liability is probable
is largely irrevelant. The focus, instead, is on the occurrence of a discrete
event. Whether the test is met will depend on the facts and circumstances.
Moreover, whether a liability may be estimated with reasonable accuracy is
not always clear.
230
Statutory complexity - the third type of issue - also confronts the tax
preparer with respect to the determination of tax accruals. An example that
comes to mind is the original issue discount rules. The original issue discount
rules, enacted in 1984,231 require the application of time value of money con-
cepts to certain items. By their very nature these rules are complex. More-
over, the applicable statutes and regulations are laden with definitions and
exceptions. 23 2 Their application to contingent liabilities is illustrative of the
complexity added by these rules.
Consideration given for the acquisition of assets often includes a contin-
gent element based on the productivity of the business or particular assets
acquired. The basis of the assets in question are not adjusted until such time
as the contingent element becomes fixed. 233 The original issue discount rules
require that a portion of the contingent payment be recharacterized as inter-
est by discounting the contingent payment back to the acquisition date.
23 4
229. For financial accounting purposes liabilities are defined as "probable future sacrifices
of economic benefits arising from present obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets
or provide services to other entities in the future as a result of past transactions or events."
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No.
6 ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, 13 (1985).
230. The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that a liability cannot be
determined with reasonable accuracy until all the necessary facts about the amount of the
liability are known. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-31-003 (April 13, 1978) (ruling that liability
for reclamation work could not be determined with reasonable accuracy because the taxpayer
had not yet performed the work nor contracted with a third party to perform the work).
231. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41(a), 98 Stat. 531 (1984).
232. See generally 1.R.C. §§ 1272-1278.
233. See Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.338(b)-3T(c)(1) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(f)(2)-
(3) (1988).
234. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(3)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (April 8, 1986). This
result is generally favorable for the buyer because the interest portion of the payment will be
deductible currently while the principal portion of the payment, allocated among the assets
purchased, will be recovered over the remaining life or cost recovery period of the asset or
assets in question.
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Moreover, the amount not recharacterized as interest must then be allocated
to the assets purchased as if the amount was incurred at the time of acquisi-
tion. 2
3 5
The fourth type of problem, ambiguity, is also prevalent with respect to
the tax treatment of accrued liabilities. Several examples may be posited. In
the case of the sale of a business, liabilities of the seller are often assumed by
the buyer. The seller must determine whether, and at what point, the liabili-
ties that have been assumed by the buyer are deductible. Existing guidance
tends to conflict and leaves unanswered questions. 2 3 6
A very recent example of an ambiguous provision is provided by
Albertson's, Inc. v. Comm'r.2 3  One of the issues presented in that case was
235. In general, allocation of the purchase price to the components of a group of acquired
assets is performed using the residual method. The residual method segregates assets into
four classes. The purchase price is allocated sequentially among the classes. Classes of
assets are allocated purchase price only to the extent there remains amounts to allocate after
previous classes have been allocated their share of the price, limited to the fair market value
of the assets within the class. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (1986); Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1060-IT(d) (1988). Contingent amounts are allocated as if they were incurred at the
time of acquisition and will, therefore, require the reapplication of the residual method. If
the asset or assets in question have been disposed of then the contingent amount that would
have been allocated to such asset or assets may be written off. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-
3T(d) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(f) (1988). If the allocation of contingent amounts
results in an increase to the basis of assets subject to cost recovery under § 168 then the
increase in basis is recoverable over the remaining years in the assets' recovery period. See
id.; Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.168-2(d)(3), 49 Fed. Reg. 5940 (1984). An exception to the
reapplication of the residual method exists for contingencies relating to specific income-
producing intangible assets, such as patents and copyrights. Purchase price adjustments relating
to theses assets are made directly to the assets in question. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-
IT(f)(4) (1988).
236. For example, in the case of nonqualified deferred compensation liability the seller is
not entitled to a deduction for liabilities that have been assumed until such time as the
employees include the payment in income although, apparently, the seller must include the
liability assumption as part of the amount realized on the sale. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-39-002
(June 15, 1989). Liability for past service cost in a qualified plan setting, however, is not
deductible at all by the seller nor is it included as part of the amount realized on the sale. See
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-36-002 (March 23, 1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-11-106 (Dec. 16, 1983).
Presumably, I.R.C. § 404 overrides the assumed liability doctrine with respect to qualified
plan liabilities. In the case of payment liabilities under the economic performance rules the
seller would obtain an immediate deduction at the time of assumption provided these liabilities
have been "expressly assume[d]." Treas. Reg. § 1.4 61-4(g)(l)(ii)(C) (1992). The regulations
do not, however, make clear exactly what is required in order for a buyer to "expressly
assume" a liability. Except for qualified plan liabilities, the buyer will generally treat the
assumption of the liability as part of the purchase price of the assets purchased. The amount
of the liabilities assumed should be allocated to the assets at the time the relevant tests for
accruing liabilities are met. For an in depth analysis of these issues see MARTIN D. GINSBURG
& JACK S. LEVIN, I MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 304 (CCH Tax
Trans. Lib. 1993).
237. Albertson's, Inc. v. Comm'r., 94 -1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 50,016 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'g
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whether interest on deferred compensation was subject to the same deductibil-
ity restrictions as the deferred compensation on which the interest was
accrued. 238 The court, relying on the plain meaning of the statute and legis-
lative history, held that interest accrued on deferred compensation is not sub-
ject to the deferred compensation rules. The court's holding has been the
subject of much debate and will not be the last word on this matter.2 3 9
The exercise of professional judgment, the fifth type of issue, does not
appear to play as great a role in this area. Of course, judgment plays a major
part in resolving ambiguities, but I am referring here to the selection among
alternative courses of action, each of which carries the same level of risk of
error. Elections are available in certain cases, but whether a liability is
accruable is generally not subject to choice, at least on an expost basis.2 4 At
that point, the decision confronting the tax preparer is whether to deduct or
capitalize the item associated with the liability.
2 14
Finally, the mechanical aspects of liability accruals pose very little
difficulty, except in cases where the original issue discount rules apply or
in cases implicating specialized deductions such as insurance reserves.
Unlike depreciation, however, the software necessary for these calculations
is more specialized and not as easily accessible as standard off-the-shelf
products.
B. Remedial Rationale
The other significant justification for prohibitions placed on the practice
of law by the laity is the fact that attorneys are governed by an elaborate code
of ethics and subject to sanction by the court for breaches of ethical duties.
The existence of ethical duties and remedial schemes to redress their breach
provide a layer of protection in addition to traditional tort remedies.
242
and rev'g 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 186 (1990), 95 T.C. 415 (1990). This case was originally reported
at 12 F.3d 1529 but was removed from the bound volume after the court granted the
government's petition for a rehearing. See infra note 239.
238. Nonqualified deferred compensation payable to employees or independent contractors
is not deductible until such time as the employee or independent contractor includes the
compensation in gross income. I.R.C. §§ 404(a)(5) & 404(d).
239. On April 11, 1994 the government's petition for rehearing was granted. See
Albertson's, Inc. 94-1 U.S.T.C. at 50,016.
240. Ex ante, the tax adviser may suggest steps necessary to allow a proper accrual to be
made or to avoid the accrual of a liability.
241. The taxpayer is given the option of capitalizing expenditures that otherwise would be
deductible. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 59(e) (providing optional capitalization and 10 year recovery
for research and experimentation expenditures, mining exploration and development costs,
intangible drilling costs and three year cost recovery for circulation expenditures).
242. Of course, accountants, like attorneys, are subject to malpractice liability should the
[Vol. I11
52
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 11 [1995], Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol11/iss1/2
INCOME TAX PRACTICE AND CPAs
Extending this rationale to inhibit tax practice by certified public accountants
is a non sequitur for two reasons. First, certified public accountants, like
attorneys, are subject to regulation by virtue of their professional status.
Second, certified public accountants engaged in tax practice are subject to an
elaborate body of rules that govern professional conduct specific to tax
practice.
1. Professional Regulation - In General
Certified public accountants are subject to the jurisdiction of state boards
of accountancy. These boards are charged with enforcing and interpreting the
statutory rules governing the licensing and regulation of certified public
accountants. Every state, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands has a board of accountancy created by a public accountancy
act. Every jurisdiction sets minimum requirements for licensing. 243 Among
the more common requirements, in addition to passing the Uniform CPA
Examination, are those governing education, experience, and continuing
professional education. 244 In addition, a majority of jurisdictions require the
passing of a special examination, or the taking of a special course in profes-
sional ethics. 245 Moreover, every jurisdiction has established a disciplinary
mechanism to deal with breaches of prescribed duties.
246
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the
natiopal trade association of certified public accountants, has promulgated a
leyvl of doo care exhibited in a particular engagement fall below a reasonable level. See
gonprally Jofeph J. Portuonodo, Malpractice Risks of Tax Practitioners, 46 N.Y.U. INST. ON
PEP, T AX, $ I.8 (1988). Moreover, in Hatfried v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1947),
h0 gori 1Tl dp clear that, for purposes of meeting the reasonable cause exception for certain
tfin p npllipo, 1 l;pxpayer will not be disadvantaged for relying on the advice of an accountant.
243, 5pp inftr pote 244 and accompanying text.
;44, A 6pmim1ry of the various requirements by jurisdiction may be found in DIGEST OF
T4Th, AccoUNTAiCY LAWS AND STATE BOARD REGULATIONS (AICPA, NASBA 1992)
[lhorat'w&,r PIKAlT PF STATE ACCOUNTANCY LAWS]. A baccalaureate degree is required in
hreho ypigorlty p0 jurisdictions in order obtain a CPA certificate and license to practice. A
inmpll pprmber pf 5tltes allow certification without a baccalaureate degree. However, in such
.qmeo, the exp~rione requirements that must be met are more stringent. See id. at 103-05.
EffectiVe in rho' yeor 2000 all new members of the AICPA will be required to have completed
150 smotincr hors of college. To date a majority of states have also adopted this requirement.
Se¢i ,11,1 ANN: STAT. ch. 2 25, para. 450/3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994). Florida has had
1WIt rpqpirampsl It !ff;ct since 1983. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.306(2)(b)(2) (West 1991).
$45, .$pPio, .7 STATE ACCOUNTANCY LAWS, supra note 244, at 113.
245 , $ge, ¢,8,, PA, $TAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.9a (Supp. 1994) (providing, inter alia, that
fNtt, dh honmsty, dl,5reditable conduct, or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to , or conviction
pf, A prire n1q1Ipn[ g an element of dishonesty or fraud are grounds for revocation or
lJp.iwin '' rho [jcensp to practice); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 117 (1987) (containing
rpip hiipf tp rh10o pf pennsylvania cited above).
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Code of Professional Conduct. 247 The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct
is comprised of Principles that are broad aspirational guides for conduct and
Rules that are specific and mandatory. The Rules prescribe minimum levels
of conduct below which a certified public accountant may not fall without
risking disciplinary action including loss of membership in the AICPA.248 The
Rules, drafted in broad general terms, 249 require, inter alia, integrity, objec-
tivity, professional competence, the exercise of due care, adequate planning
and supervision in the performance of professional services, and the mainte-
nance of client confidences. 25° Moreover, the Rules prohibit acts discreditable
to the profession 25' and provide restrictions on the use of contingent fee ar-
rangements,252 commissions and referral fees,253 and advertising and solicita-
tion.25 4
2. Tax Practice Specific Regulation.
In addition to a professional code of conduct, certified public accoun-
tants engaged in tax practice are subject to a variety of standards specific to
tax practice. The AICPA has issued Statements on Responsibility in Tax
247. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (AICPA 1988).
248. A member of the AICPA engaged in the practice of public accounting is required to
observe all the Rules of Conduct. The practice of public accounting, defined in rather circular
fashion, as "holding out to be a CPA or public accountant and at the same time performing
for a client one or more types of services rendered by public accountants" encompasses income
tax practice. See id. at Introduction. A member not in public practice must observe Rule 102,
governing integrity and objectivity, and Rule 501, prohibiting acts discreditable to the
profession. Id.
249. Detailed guidance is issued in the form of Interpretations of the AICPA Rules of
Conduct. These Interpretations are promulgated by the Executive Committee of the
Professional Ethics Division of the AICPA. A summary of Interpretations promulgated under
the various Rules of Conduct may be found in LARRY P. BAILEY, 1994 GAAS GUIDE 44.05-
.44 (1994). Additional guidance may be found in the Rulings on Ethics issued by the Executive
Committee of the AICPA. These Rulings apply the Rules of Conduct and Interpretations to a
particular set of circumstances. A synopsis of the various Rulings, organized by Rule of
Conduct, is available in id. at 44.44-62.
250. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 247 at Rules 102, 201, 301.
Attempts to maintain minimum levels of quality services are not limited to the promulgation
and enforcement of the Code of Professional Conduct. In January 1988 the membership of
the AICPA voted to require members engaged in public accounting to participate in mandatory
practice monitoring programs. These programs require CPA firms to either undergo a peer
review or enroll in the AICPA quality review program. For a detailed discussion of these
programs see HOWARD P. MCMURRIAN, ET. AL., GUIDE TO QUALITY CONTROL (7th ed.
Practitioners Publishing Co. 1994).
251. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 247 at Rule 501.
252. Id. at Rule 302.
253. Id. at Rule 503.
254. Id. at Rule 502.
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Practice. These Statements - eight in all 255 - establish standards for tax
practice and define the responsibility of the certified public accountant to the
client, the public, and the government. 256 The Standards provide guidance on
a broad range of issues including the taking of tax return positions, departure
from administrative rulings or court decisions, knowledge of errors, and the
provision of tax advice. Unlike the Code of Professional Conduct, these
Standards will not trigger sanction for their breach. However, they may be
indirectly enforced by the Internal Revenue Service, the courts, or state agen-
257cies.
Moreover, in federal practice, the tax practitioner must contend with a
plethora of statutory and administrative provisions designed to maintain the
integrity of a predominately self-assessed system of taxation. Circular 230
imposes a number of duties and restrictions on persons practicing before the
Internal Revenue Service.2 58 Moreover, the Treasury Department has the
authority to suspend or disbar a person from practicing before it for, inter alia,
incompetence, disreputable conduct, or violation of statutes or regulations. 259
One court has expressly noted that administrative control over practitioners
diminishes the need for independent measures designed to protect the
public.
260
An additional source of control over tax practitioners is exercised by the
255. Eleven Statements were issued between 1964 and 1977. In 1988 these Statements
were significantly revised and reissued in the form of eight Statements.
256. The ABA counterpart to the AICPA Statements on Responsibility in Tax Practice is
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), reprinted
in 39 TAX LAW. 631 (1986) [hereinafter Opinion 85-352]. Prior to the adoption of Opinion
85-352 basic ethical standards governing tax practice were found in ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965) [hereinafter Opinion 314]. Opinion
314 has continued relevance, however, to lawyers' responsibility as advocates before the
Internal Revenue Service. For a thorough analysis of Opinion 85-352 see Theodore C. Falk,
Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39
TAX LAW. 643 (1986).
257. See William L. Raby, AICPA Responsibilities Statements as Standards of Tax Practice,
20 TAX ADVISER 160 (1989).
258. See Circular 230, § 10.21-10.33.
259. 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) (1988); Circular 230, § 10.50. Disreputable conduct is defined in
§ 10.51 of Circular 230. A willful violation of Circular 230, in addition to the acts enumerated
in § 10.51, may also be grounds for suspension or disbarment. Id. § 10.51. For a discussion
of certain procedural aspects of Circular 230 disciplinary actions see WOLFMAN, ET AL.,
supra note 46, IT 117.0152-.0153. No attempt was made to compile the duties imposed on tax
practitioners by state or local tax authorities. The threat of sanctions at the federal level
should provide an ample deterrent because, notwithstanding the increasing importance of
state and local tax burdens, the inability to practice at the federal level would, in most cases,
prove to be a death sentence for a tax practice.
260. See The Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion - Nonlawyer Preparation of Pension Plans,
571 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. 1990).
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Internal Revenue Code's penalty scheme. In addition to taxpayer penalties
the Internal Revenue Code contains several provisions aimed directly at tax
practitioners. 261 These penalties are not limited to tax return preparers but also
cover tax shelter activity and aiding and abetting taxpayers in the understate-
ment of tax liability.
262
V. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, in terms of expertise in tax matters, there are differences
between the law and accounting professions. However, these differences
relate, in the main, to the type of tax work bes't performed by each profession.
With that said, blanket generalizations, although potentially accurate at a
macro level, fail to consider the individual case. Certified public accountants
should be judged individually and their expertise subjected to existing profes-
sional standards. We do not expect all lawyers to be tax experts as the price
for allowing lawyers to be engaged in tax practice. Let's grant the same cour-
tesy to certified public accountants. The tax law is a complex, fluid body of
law. The public is best served by allowing the marketplace to decide how and
among whom services will be divided.
261. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6694 (providing monetary penalties on return preparers where any
part of an understatement of tax is due to a position for which there was not a realistic
possibility of success); I.R.C. § 6695 (providing monetary penalties for failure to provide
certain information to a client or the Internal Revenue Service). For a comparison of the
realistic possibility of success standard of § 6694 with the ABA and AICPA standards see
WOLFMAN, ET AL., supra note 46, T 214.
262. See I.R.C. §§ 6700-6701. In addition to monetary penalties the Internal Revenue
Service may seek injunctive relief, in appropriate circumstances, under I.R.C. §§ 7407 &
7408.
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